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While managerial performance always plays a critical role in determining
firm performance, a manager’s importance is elevated during bankruptcy. A
manager in bankruptcy both runs the firm and helps form a plan of reorganization. In light of this critical role, one would expect that bankruptcy scholarship would place considerable emphasis on the role of CEO compensation in incentivizing managerial performance in bankruptcy; however, the opposite is
true. Bankruptcy scholars and practitioners tend to emphasize other levers of
corporate governance, such as the role of debtor-in-possession financiers, rather
than the importance of CEO compensation. This Article seeks to revive CEO
compensation as an important governance lever in bankruptcy. First, the Article examines current ideas and practices of managerial compensation in bank-
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ruptcy and finds them wanting. The Article next proposes a novel bankruptcy
compensation plan—debt compensation—that provides better incentives for
managers to perform efficiently. By granting managers a fixed proportion of
unsecured debt in the bankrupt firm, debt compensation creates valueenhancing incentives similar to the incentives created by the stock grants and
stock options that are heavily employed by solvent firms to compensate managers.
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INTRODUCTION
While managerial performance always plays a critical role in determining firm performance, a manager assumes a heightened role in
bankruptcy. In bankruptcy, the manager in control of the debtor-inpossession makes all the decisions that the manager of an ordinary
firm must make regarding firm operations and strategy; however, the
manager’s role does not end there. Instead, the manager also plays
an essential role in forming a plan of reorganization or liquidation.
This task involves many responsibilities, including weighing the choice
of liquidation versus reorganization, mediating between different
classes of creditors, and selecting the optimal capital structure for the
reorganized firm.
How unfortunate, then, that managerial compensation in bankruptcy is so restricted. While managers of ordinary firms receive a
wide array of incentive compensation devices, compensation for a
1
manager in bankruptcy is far more ineffectual and limited. In addition, managerial interests tend to be “closely aligned with the share2
holders,” making it unlikely that a manager will design a reorganiza-

1

See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 183 (3d ed. 2001)
(“The usual checks that keep the managers of a firm in line—the prospects of profits
from their equity interests . . . are displaced once a bankruptcy petition is filed.”).
2
Id. at 182.
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tion plan that maximizes value for the creditors of an insolvent firm.
The limitations of executive compensation in bankruptcy are echoed
by the lack of scholarly attention to the subject. While the question of
executive compensation is the subject of a vast literature in both fi3
nance and law, analyses of corporate governance in bankruptcy tend
4
to give the subject short shrift. In an important exception to the pattern of downplaying the role of executive compensation in bankruptcy, Professor David Skeel details some managerial compensation
5
schemes that are prevalent in bankruptcy. These include “pay-tostay” agreements to retain key managers in the wake of a bankruptcy
6
declaration and managerial bonuses for speedy reorganization. In

3

See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNPROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 1-12 (2004) (summarizing and critiquing the accepted theories of excecutive compensation, and referring to both the
finance and legal literatures on point).
4
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56
STAN. L. REV. 673, 693-99 (2003) (arguing that creditors enjoy considerable power in
bankruptcy); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing
Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1211 & n.4 (2006) (emphasizing
the role of creditor monitoring in bankruptcy and contrasting that with the emphasis
on matters of executive compensation outside of bankruptcy); Kenneth Ayotte & David
A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 456-57 (2006) (book review) (stating that “[debtor-inpossession] financing is now the most important corporate governance lever in Chapter 11” and remaining silent on the topic of executive compensation). An important
exception to this trend is David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate
Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 920, 943-49 (2003), which addresses
the “fairness and efficiency concerns” involved with both pre-bankruptcy executive
compensation packages, as well as those offered after a bankruptcy petition has been
filed. There is no doubt that creditor controls over bankrupt corporations and managers constitute an important governance lever. Creditor control is no panacea, however, as managers will inevitably have some discretion in making choices (otherwise
they could not “manage”).
5
See Skeel, supra note 4, at 926-30. Even this article, however, pays more attention
to debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing than to executive compensation. Id.
6
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) sharply limits the use of pay-to-stay agreements. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(c)(1)
(West Supp. 2006) (providing that the debtor shall not make payments to insiders such
as executives “for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s
business”). BAPCPA excepts from this rule situations where a court has expressly
found (1) that “[t]he payment or obligation is essential to keep the person from accepting a bona fide job offer for the same or greater pay;” (2) that “[t]he person’s continued retention is essential to the survival of the business;” and (3) that “[t]he amount
of the payment to be made or obligation to be incurred does not exceed either 10
times the amounts paid to nonmanagement employees in the same calendar year or 25
percent of the amounts paid to insiders in the calendar year preceding that in which
the payment is to be made.” Jason S. Brookner, Law Limits Executive Compensation, TEX.
FULFILLED

2007]

PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE IN BANKRUPTCY

781

addition, Professor Skeel mentions proposals for improving these
compensation schemes. Skeel states that the ideal solution would be
to “base the managers’ pay on the overall value of the debtor’s assets
7
at the conclusion of the Chapter 11 case.” Skeel explains that because of uncertainties regarding valuation, however, this solution will
only be attainable when firm value is reasonably well established, such
8
as in liquidation. Instead, Skeel proposes granting stock in the reorganized company to managers; in this way, managers will have incen9
tives to maximize value.
Unfortunately, pay-to-stay agreements, rapid-reorganization bo10
nuses, and the Skeel proposals all contain significant flaws. Pay-tostay agreements may enable the debtor to retain key managerial personnel, but they do nothing to ensure that a manager will attempt to
maximize value. Rapid-reorganization bonuses incentivize a speedy
reorganization, not a value-maximizing one. Granting a manager a
percentage of liquidation proceeds works well if liquidation is the obvious choice. When liquidation is not the efficient option, however,
the prospect of a percentage of the asset return in liquidation may encourage a manager to push for liquidation even when reorganization
would create more value. Finally, granting stock in the reorganized
company skews managerial incentives in a number of ways. First, it
may encourage a manager to prefer reorganization when liquidation
is a more efficient option. Second, owning stock in the reorganized
company means that a manager has an incentive to ensure that the
equity of the reorganized company is of the utmost value. This encourages the manager to propose reorganization plans wherein the
reorganized company has little or no debt, even if the company would
11
have a higher total valuation with some debt in its capital structure.
LAW., May 29, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1150275918997
(synthesizing the terms of 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(c)(1)(A)-(C)).
7
Skeel, supra note 4, at 948.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Many bankrupt companies are currently run by “turnaround managers” who
specialize in resuscitating distressed companies. See, e.g., Steven F. Hodkinson, Credibility: The Real Key to Turnaround Success, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2006, at 36 (describing
some practices of a successful turnaround manager). If the turnaround managers are
hired by individuals with an interest in maximizing the value of the firm as a whole,
rather than the claim of one class, and the turnaround managers are repeat players,
then failures in compensation will be mitigated by the turnaround manager’s desire
for a good reputation.
11
If the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies, then this concern is not relevant.
Modern corporate finance has identified several reasons why the theorem does not
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All of these problems stem (at least in part) from a fundamental
difficulty of granting incentive compensation in bankruptcy as compared to incentive compensation in an ordinary solvent firm. In an
ordinary solvent firm, a manager’s fiduciary duty is associated with the
12
residual claimants—the equity holders. As a result, equity-based incentive compensation plans, such as stock options, are relatively easy
13
to adopt. By granting equity to the manager, incentive compensation aligns managerial incentives with those of the equity residual
claimants—when the residual claimants benefit, so does the manager.
The manager’s pecuniary incentives accord with her fiduciary duties.
In bankruptcy, by contrast, the residual claimants (and the manager’s
14
fiduciary responsibilities ) are harder to identify. Most frequently,
the residual claimants, and those owed fiduciary obligations, are unse15
cured creditors. In response, the executive compensation proposals

apply in most cases, including tax considerations and the mitigation of principal-agent
problems. The wide variety of capital structures witnessed among public corporations
suggests that capital structure matters, in spite of the Modigliani-Miller theorem. See
MARK GRINBLATT & SHERIDAN TITMAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE STRATEGY
498-99 (2d ed. 2002).
12
Most suits for breach of fiduciary duty are brought by equity shareholders. See,
e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 863-64 (Del. 1985) (concerning a class action
suit brought by shareholders against corporate directors for breach of the duty of
care).
13
Equity-based compensation plans have themselves come under attack over the
last few years. This is because the plans seldom provide the incentives for which they
are intended. Instead, they often serve as a vehicle for managers to extract rents from
their corporation. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753 (2002) (arguing that
both the process by which executive compensation plans are adopted and the empirical evidence regarding such plans support the claim that managers have significant
influence over the substance of their compensation).
14
To be precise, fiduciary responsibilities are owed to the corporation rather than
to a group of claimants. In reality, fiduciary duties will typically be associated with a
group of claimants against the firm because of the difficulty of determining fiduciary
duties to an abstract entity such as the corporation.
15
Courts have implicitly recognized that creditors are common residual claimants
by maintaining that corporate officers of insolvent companies have fiduciary duties to
creditors. For examples of such judicial recognitions, see Unsecured Creditors Committee
of Debtor STN Enterprises v. Noyes (In re STN Enterprises), 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985);
FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660
F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981); Thomson Kernaghan & Co. v. Global Intellicom, Inc., Nos. 90
Civ. 3005 (DLC), 99 Civ. 3015 (DLC), 2000 WL 640653, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 17,
2000); Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Buckhead America Corp. v. Reliance Capital
Group, Inc. (In re Buckhead America Corp.), 178 B.R. 956, 968 (D. Del. 1994); Brandt v.
Hicks, Muse & Co. (In re Healthco Int’l, Inc.), 208 B.R. 288, 300 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997)
(interpreting Delaware law); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787-90
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described above use some proxy for residual claimants when awarding
compensation. This process is subject to errors. For example, granting the manager equity in the reorganized firm works well if the residual claimants in bankruptcy also will hold equity in the reorganized
firm. If, however, some of the residual claimants in bankruptcy hold
debt in the reorganized entity, then there may be a conflict of interest
16
between the manager and the residual claimants.
To remedy these defects and reorient the scholarly debate in
bankruptcy toward the problem of executive compensation rather
than focusing almost exclusively on other means of corporate governance, this Article proposes a novel form of managerial incentive compensation for publicly traded corporations in bankruptcy. The unsecured creditors’ committee should be granted a new (conditional)
right—the right to grant the manager a percentage of the unsecured
debt (a “vertical strip” of unsecured debt) currently held by the credi17
tors of the firm. This right would be subject to several conditions, as
described below. Because unsecured creditors are the most common
18
residual claimants in bankruptcy, this right would enable the residual claimants to align the incentives of the manager with their own.
When the value of a bankrupt firm rises, it is typically the unsecured
creditors who obtain the greatest benefit because they are the most
common residual claimants. Granting a manager debt in the bankrupt firm allows the creditors to share these gains with the manager
and ensures that the manager has the appropriate incentive to pursue
these gains.

(Del. Ch. 1992); Crédit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathé Commications Corp., No.
12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
16
Even when unsecured creditors hold debt in the reorganized firm, the debt that
they receive in the reorganized firm is often worth less than the face value of the debt
that these creditors held in the bankrupt firm, indicating that the unsecured creditors
are the residual claimants in spite of the fact that they never hold equity.
17
Throughout this Article, I will refer to this proposal as “debt compensation.”
18
In a recent empirical survey of bankruptcies, unsecured creditors proved to be the
residual claimants in over half of the Chapter 11 bankruptcies. See Arturo Bris et al., The
Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Cash Auctions vs. Chapter 11 Bargaining, at tbl.8 (EFA 2004
Maastricht Meetings, Paper No. 5155, 2004) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=556930 (summarizing findings from a sample of cases
from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts of Arizona and the Southern District of New
York). Equity holders (who share many similarities with unsecured creditors in bankruptcy and can also join the debt compensation scheme as described below) were the
residual claimants in another quarter of Chapter 11 cases. Id. Thus, secured creditors
(who are not eligible for the debt compensation scheme) obtain full recovery in a
large majority of Chapter 11 cases.
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Granting the manager a percentage of unsecured debt solves
many of the inefficient incentive problems generated by the plans described above. If a rapid reorganization increases the total value of
the firm and thereby the total recovery for unsecured debt, then a
manager receiving a percentage of this debt will have a greater incentive to reorganize rapidly because a rapid reorganization increases the
value of the manager’s own debt. If a rapid reorganization destroys
value, however, then the manager will avoid this choice, unlike a
manager receiving a rapid-reorganization bonus. Similarly, a manager
receiving a percentage of unsecured debt has no incentive to inefficiently favor reorganization or liquidation. If liquidation is the most
efficient choice, then this will be reflected in an increase in the value
of unsecured debt. Because the manager receives a percentage of this
increase in value, the manager will have an incentive to choose efficient liquidation. Finally, debt compensation protects against the
tendency of the manager to favor equity in bankruptcy. When the
manager of a bankrupt company is the same person as the prebankruptcy manager, that manager will have many ties to equity,
which used to control the firm. For example, the manager may have
received grants of stock or stock options before the company became
bankrupt, giving the manager a direct incentive to favor equity. Debt
compensation protects against the manager’s inclination to favor equity by giving the manager a direct financial incentive in the performance of debt. If the manager favors equity and in the process destroys
value, then the manager receiving debt compensation will experience
a financial penalty, as the value of unsecured debt will diminish.
Enabling the creditors’ committee to grant the manager debt is
no panacea. A debt compensation plan must address several concerns. First, secured creditors may be harmed by the proposal. Debt
compensation gives the manager an incentive to raise the value of unsecured debt, possibly at the expense of secured debt. The manager
will have an incentive to take potentially value-destroying risks because
the upside risk is enjoyed by unsecured creditors (and shared by the
manager) while the downside risk is borne by the secured creditors
19
(and not shared by the manager). When the value of the firm’s assets is near the value of the secured debt claims alone, for example,
19

This problem resembles the “asset substitution problem” that is commonly discussed in corporate law and finance, in which the interests of debt and equity are at
odds. See GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 11, at 569 (arguing that debt provides an
incentive for firms to take on unnecessary risk because increasing a firm’s risk transfers
wealth from the firm’s debt holders to its equity holders).
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the likelihood that secured creditors will be hurt by value-destroying
managerial risk taking is enhanced. Similarly, an extraordinarily high
award of unsecured debt gives the manager greater incentive to favor
unsecured creditors at the expense of those who are secured. To
mitigate these problems, the bankruptcy judge should deny the unsecured creditors’ committee’s debt compensation grant under these
20
circumstances.
Second, debt compensation must be structured to avoid conflicts
of interest among unsecured creditors. For example, if the manager
owns 1% of some unsecured debt but no percentage of other claims,
the manager would have an incentive to favor some classes of unsecured creditors over others when forming a plan of reorganization.
To prevent this, the creditors’ committee’s decision on the size of the
debt compensation must bind all unsecured creditors. Such a vertical
strip approach means that the manager potentially holds unsecured
debt with many different priority levels, but a constant percentage of
each type of debt. This creates a level playing field among unsecured
creditors. While some unsecured creditors may object to the loss of
some percentage of their claims, this decision would be no different
than many other actions taken by the creditors’ committee that have
the potential to diminish the value of some creditors’ claims. As a result, the binding nature of the creditors’ committee’s decision should
not be problematic.
Alternatively, the proposal could be modified to allow the most
senior unsecured creditors to opt out of awarding debt compensation.
If senior unsecured creditors are extremely confident that they will
receive their money in any case, then they may see no need to spend
money compensating the manager. An opt-out provision for unsecured creditors would reduce the cost of the proposal. While the optout option may provide incentives for a manager to favor junior unsecured creditors over senior unsecured creditors, senior unsecured
creditors will have the ability to weigh this concern when determining
whether or not to opt out.
Third, equity may also be concerned about debt compensation,
since debt compensation gives the manager the incentive to favor unsecured creditors over equity. In some cases, this gives the manager
the incentive to be overly cautious. To prevent this problem, equity

20

Alternatively, judges could approve an unsecured debt compensation structure
on the condition that the unsecured creditors make good on any loss to the secured
creditors.
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should be entitled to match the percentage compensation award
given by the creditors’ committee. This will ensure that equity is not
disfavored with respect to unsecured debt by the manager.
Finally, the cost of the proposal may be a concern. Debt compensation may increase the salaries of managers in bankruptcy. Because
the creditors’ committee chooses whether or not to award debt compensation, however, the cost of debt compensation should not be a
major concern. Unlike ordinary boards, the manager is unlikely to
control a creditors’ committee. If the committee chooses to award
debt compensation, the decision provides strong evidence that the
committee believes that debt compensation is worth the cost. If the
committee does not believe so, then it will not award a debt compensation grant.
Thus, a creditors’ committee’s right to grant debt compensation
offers a new means to improve managerial performance in bankruptcy. In spite of a number of concerns about the proposal, it should
be viable if adopted as described here. Moreover, courts can adopt
this approach conservatively at first by rejecting aggressive compensation proposals. Then, as judges grow more familiar with the debt
compensation procedure, the size and prevalence of the debt compensation awards and their positive effects on managerial performance in bankruptcy can grow.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I outlines an example that
will be used to illustrate many of the points developed in this paper.
Part II examines existing managerial compensation schemes in bankruptcy and discusses their flaws in greater detail. Part III details the
debt compensation proposal and examines how the proposal addresses many of the flaws of the existing compensation schemes described in Part II. Part IV discusses possible objections to the debt
compensation proposal and details how the proposals can be modified to account for these concerns.
I. A HYPOTHETICAL FIRM IN BANKRUPTCY
Many of the proposals and critiques in this Article are best developed through an example. In order to maintain continuity, this Part
outlines the basic framework of the example. As the Article continues, many aspects of the example will be modified to illustrate particular points.
Suppose that a firm (“Firm”) declares bankruptcy. Suppose further that:
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Assumption 1: Firm has three classes of claimants: secured claimants, who are owed $10 million; unsecured creditors (all of equal pri21
ority), who are owed $50 million; and equity claimants.
Assumption 2: If Firm liquidates, it will raise $20 million.
Assumption 3: The value of Firm if it reorganizes is more uncertain
than the liquidation value and depends upon the actions of the man22
ager (“Manager”). The exact relationship between managerial effort
and value will be developed in greater detail in later sections of this
Article.
Assumption 4: Manager generally acts to maximize salary. Manager tends to favor equity because Manager owns equity (for example,
restricted stock grants and stock options, as well as ordinary stock)
and has a longstanding fiduciary relationship with the stockholders.
II. EXISTING MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
ARRANGEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Managers have two jobs in bankruptcy. First, they run the corporation, just as ordinary managers do. In addition, they form a plan of
23
reorganization or liquidation. This typically involves a fundamental
reshuffling of the firm’s capital structure, as well as new agreements
with other firm stakeholders such as employees and lessors. The
manager’s role is therefore particularly important in bankruptcy, and
has critical implications for all claimants on the bankrupt firm.

21

The assumption that there is only one class of unsecured creditors is not farfetched. Section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that all “substantially similar” creditors should be placed in the same class of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a)
(2000). Because all unsecured claimants have the same rights outside of bankruptcy,
there is a reasonable argument that all unsecured claimants should be in the same
class. See Granada Wines, Inc. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 748 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1984) (recognizing that “[s]eparate classifications for
unsecured creditors are only justified ‘where the legal character of their claims is such
as to accord them a status different from other unsecured creditors’” (quoting In re
L.A. Land & Invs., Ltd., 282 F. Supp. 448, 454 (D. Haw. 1968), aff’d, 447 F.2d 1366 (9th
Cir. 1971))); BAIRD, supra note 1, at 208 (arguing that trade and deficiency claims
should be in the same class since they are both unsecured claims and neither enjoys
priority over the other).
22
Throughout this Article, I will use the singular term “manager.” Management,
of course, often consists of several individuals. All of the points made in this Article,
however, apply equally well to the case of a management team as they do to a single
manager.
23
See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (granting the debtor an exclusive right to develop a
plan of reorganization for 120 days).
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24

Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code grants considerable
powers to the manager of a firm declaring bankruptcy. For example,
Chapter 11 authorizes managers to operate the firm as “debtors-inpossession” and grants managers a window during which they have the
25
exclusive right to propose a plan of reorganization. The Bankruptcy
Code thereby combines considerable managerial powers with limited
managerial controls—a recipe for trouble. It should not be surprising, then, that managerial performance in the early days of the Bankruptcy Code was poor. As Professor Skeel stated, “[m]anagers were
26
playing with creditors’ money.”
Luckily, the bankruptcy system has confronted some of these
problems. In his survey article, Professor Skeel describes several corporate governance techniques currently in use as well as a number of
27
new proposals. Some of these methods, such as debtor-in-possession
28
financing, control the manager’s behavior indirectly, while others,
29
such as rapid-reorganization bonuses, give the manager direct incentives to behave in certain ways. While all of these methods constitute
important improvements with respect to the early Chapter 11 practices, they all retain some critical flaws.
A. Debtor-in-Possession Financing
Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing allows some creditors to obtain considerable leverage over a debtor-in-possession. DIP financing
works as follows: Under § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, creditors who
provide financing to debtors in bankruptcy enjoy many enhanced
rights (subject to court approval), such as priority with respect to all
30
secured and unsecured loans and administrative expenses. When a
debtor needs cash to continue operations, a prospective DIP lender
can make numerous demands of the debtor. These demands may include a change in management or seats on the debtor’s board of di-

24

Id. §§ 1101-1174.
Id. § 1121(b). For a detailed discussion of corporate governance in Chapter 11,
see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 160-83, 212-37 (2001).
26
Skeel, supra note 4, at 920.
27
See id. at 919-20 (outlining Skeel’s discussion of corporate governance in the
context of bankruptcy).
28
Id. at 923-26 (outlining the structure of DIP financing).
29
Id. at 928 (describing the growing practice of giving managers bonuses for
quickly selling a debtor’s assets).
30
11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1), (d) (2000).
25
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31

rectors. Thus, if a manager will need DIP financing, her behavior is
constrained by the prospect that the DIP lender will demand a change
in management if the manager’s performance is weak.
DIP financing thus provides a useful check on managerial behavior. However, it does not come close to providing a comprehensive
32
solution to the problem of managerial performance in bankruptcy.
First, DIP financing comes with its own flaws, such as the possibility of
33
overinvestment. Second, not all debtors need DIP financing. When
34
the debtor does not require cash to operate, a manager is unlikely to
submit to the requirements of DIP lenders. Third, DIP lenders are
not ideal monitors of managerial performance. Because DIP lenders
enjoy enhanced priority, they may not be particularly interested in the
firm’s performance, as they are guaranteed repayment in almost all
eventualities. Even if the DIP lender is not assured of repayment, it
will be risk averse because, as a super-secured creditor, it only risks
35
nonpayment if the firm’s assets fall in value. In either case, the DIP
lender is unlikely to pressure the manager to make value-maximizing
decisions because the DIP lender is not the residual claimant. This
tendency will be exacerbated when the DIP lender is already a large
36
creditor of the bankrupt firm. If this is the case, then the DIP lender

31

Skeel, supra note 4, at 931.
Large DIP lenders include J.P. Morgan and GE Capital, which were both involved in making multibillion-dollar DIP loans to WorldCom and Kmart. Daniel Gross,
WorldCom Is Bankrupt; So How Did It Get a $2 Billion Loan?, SLATE, July 24, 2002,
http://www.slate.com/id/2068443.
33
The knowledge that DIP financing can be obtained after all assets have already
been secured can lead a firm to overinvest in current projects, secure in the knowledge
that if a profitable future opportunity arises, the firm will be able to find financing.
For a general discussion of DIP financing, see George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993).
34
Debtors in bankruptcy enjoy a stay from loan repayments. Any debtor with positive operating cash flow or significant cash reserves will therefore be able to operate in
bankruptcy without the need for DIP lending. Of course, companies with positive cash
flow or large cash reserves are unlikely to declare bankruptcy. Examples of companies
that have declared bankruptcy with positive cash flows and cash reserves include companies facing large tort liabilities, such as Johns Manville (asbestos liability) and Dow
Corning (breast implant liability). For a discussion of these cases, see Yair Listokin &
Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1435, 1443-51, 1490 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
846, 858 nn.33-34, 867 n.58, 894 n.146, 915 n.225 (1984).
35
For a more detailed discussion of “the troublesome incentives of a DIP lender
who faces at least some downside risk,” see Skeel, supra note 4, at 935-39.
36
For a case in which the unsecured creditors’ committee objected to the terms of
a DIP loan, see Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of New World Pasta Co. v. New
World Pasta Co., 322 B.R. 560, 564 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
32
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may favor actions that maximize the value of its other loans, rather
than actions that maximize the value of the firm as a whole. Finally,
even if the DIP lender replaces the management, someone must run
the company. If incentives for the new managers are not appropriate,
then DIP financing has altered, rather than eliminated, the corporate
governance problem for firms in bankruptcy.
B. Managerial Compensation
Managerial “pay-for-performance” plans offer the potential for a
more direct and comprehensive solution to the managerial incentive
problem in bankruptcy. If a manager’s pay can be aligned with the
value she creates or destroys in bankruptcy, then the manager will
have a greater incentive to maximize firm value. Rather than depending on managerial goodwill to ensure proper behavior, incentive compensation plans rely on managerial self-interest to stimulate good
behavior. Unfortunately, designing pay-for-performance plans in
bankruptcy is tricky. All of the existing and proposed plans suffer
from serious flaws, suggesting an acute need for new proposals in this
area.
1. Pay-To-Stay Bonuses
Professor Skeel reviews several pay-for-performance plans. The
37
simplest of these is the “pay-to-stay” bonus. In order to prevent talented personnel from leaving a troubled debtor, some companies offer bonuses to key managers who remain with the company through
bankruptcy. In addition to the troubling perceptions generated by
granting bonuses to the manager of a newly bankrupt company, payto-stay bonuses give a manager no incentives for good performance.
If Manager of Firm received a pay-to-stay bonus, for example, it would
have no effect on Manager’s incentives to choose liquidation (Assumption 2) as opposed to reorganization (Assumption 3), nor would
it have any impact on Manager’s incentives to choose the best reorganization plan under Assumption 3. Debtor firms would be better
served by using the money currently devoted to pay-to-stay bonuses on
pay-for-performance plans. These plans give managers an incentive to

37

See Skeel, supra note 4, at 926-28 (“Despite their reservations . . . creditors increasingly have concluded that they are better off paying to keep the debtor’s existing
managers in place.”).
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stay while also creating incentives for value-maximizing managerial
behavior.
2. Rapid-Reorganization Bonuses
The most widely used pay-for-performance measure at present is
38
the rapid-reorganization bonus. Under this plan, a manager’s compensation is tied to the speed of reorganization: the faster the reor39
ganization, the greater the manager’s compensation.
When firm
value is closely correlated with reorganization speed, a rapidreorganization bonus properly aligns the manager’s incentives with
those of the residual claimants, who benefit most from a rapid reorganization. In many cases, however, faster reorganizations do not
maximize value. If a firm’s capital structure is reorganized hastily and
ineffectually, for example, then the firm may experience difficulties
after it emerges from a rapid reorganization, ultimately hurting the
value recouped by creditors. Moreover, the rapid-reorganization bonus neglects any incentive for good management during the reorganization of the company. With no reward for effectively operating the
company, a manager will focus primarily on a plan of reorganization.
The firm’s operations may suffer accordingly.
The example outlined in Part I provides an illustration of the dangers of rapid reorganization. Suppose that Manager receives a rapidreorganization bonus, but is otherwise compensated by a flat salary.
Assumption 3 of this example adds that the reorganization value of
Firm depends upon Manager’s efforts. Suppose further that Manager
can choose whether or not to hire consultants who will facilitate the
reorganization process, that the consultants cost $10 million in fees,
and that by speeding the reorganization process, they raise the value
of Firm by $5 million. Efficiency dictates that Manager should not
hire the consultants because the consultants cost more than the value
they provide. With a rapid-reorganization bonus, however, Manager
would choose to hire the consultants. Manager’s salary goes up when
reorganization is speedier, but is otherwise independent of Firm’s
value. As a result, our self-interested Manager would choose to hire
the costly consultants.

38

See id. at 928 (noting that creditors “in recent cases” have insisted on linking
manager compensation to the firm’s “progress under Chapter 11,” and that the easiest
way to measure this progress is by speed of reorganization).
39
The Enron managerial pay proposal included bonuses for selling assets quickly.
Frank Ahrens, Enron Files for New Bonuses, Severance, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2002, at D13.
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3. Percentage-of-Assets Compensation Plans
Professor Skeel recognizes the need for different measures that
“more closely link managers’ effectiveness to their bankruptcy pay,”
40
and discusses some possibilities for meeting this demand. He asserts
that the best measure of managerial performance is to base managerial compensation on the overall value of the debtor’s assets at the
conclusion of bankruptcy and then recommends this approach for
41
bankrupt firms that undergo liquidation.
a. Skewed Incentives
The “percentage-of-assets” approach, however, fails to offer a general solution to the managerial compensation problem in bankruptcy.
As Professor Skeel notes, the percentage-of-assets approach can be
problematic in Chapter 11 reorganizations because it is difficult to obtain an accurate valuation of the debtor’s assets at the end of bank42
ruptcy.
The percentage-of-assets approach suffers from some other flaws
not mentioned by Professor Skeel. For example, it encourages managers to unduly favor liquidation over reorganization. Returning to
the example developed in Part I, suppose that Manager’s compensation scheme calls for her to receive 1% of Firm’s assets should Firm be
liquidated and that Manager would receive a salary of $80,000 in the
event of a reorganization. Suppose also that Firm will be worth
$25 million after reorganization. Reorganization thus realizes more
value than liquidation. Manager, however, prefers liquidation since
43
she would receive $200,000 in compensation, which is greater than
the $80,000 salary she would receive after reorganization. Because of
this problem, the percentage-of-assets approach can only be used

40

Skeel, supra note 4, at 948-49.
Id. at 948.
42
Id. In this respect, the percentage-of-assets approach differs from pay-forperformance schemes (such as stock options) outside of bankruptcy, which are easy to
value because they are granted in a form for which the market provides a valuation.
The debt compensation proposal described in the next Section of this Article helps
obtain the tight link between managerial performance and compensation that Skeel
seeks without the need to directly value the debtor’s assets at the end of bankruptcy.
43
Recall that in liquidation, Manager would receive 1% of $20 million.
41
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when liquidation is unquestionably the preferred option, severely lim44
iting this approach’s value.
b. Low-Powered Incentives
The percentage-of-assets approach also specifies a very “low45
To see this,
powered” and expensive pay-for-performance plan.
modify Assumption 2 to allow Manager’s effort to impact Firm’s liquidation value. If Manager performs poorly, Firm is worth $10 million
in liquidation, but if Manager performs well, Firm is worth $12 million
in liquidation. In these circumstances, granting Manager a percentage of the first $10 million of Firm is wasteful. Firm will be worth at
least $10 million no matter what Manager does, so granting Manager
a percentage of the first $10 million (assuming Manager still gets 1%
of the value of the firm) costs money while generating no incentives
for improved performance. Rather than granting a simple percentage
of Firm’s assets, a better pay-for-performance plan would only grant
Manager a percentage of the value of the debtor’s assets in excess of
$10 million. Under this plan, Manager only receives a bonus if her
performance generates value; no money is wasted on paying Manager
unnecessarily.
The percentage-of-assets plan also fails to specify how the costs of
CEO compensation should be shared among the firm’s various creditors. The secured creditors of Firm would dislike the percentage-ofassets approach because their claims are only $10 million (Assumption 1)
and Firm is guaranteed to be worth that much regardless of the quality of Manager’s performance during liquidation. Thus, Firm’s secured creditors would view the percentage-of-assets approach as wasteful. Unsecured creditors, by contrast, would favor the percentage-ofassets approach because it incentivizes Manager to create additional
value and thus increase the amount recovered by this class of creditors. The percentage-of-assets approach must develop some means of
allocating costs between these two classes of creditors. For all of these
reasons, the percentage-of-assets approach, while intriguing, does not

44

This example is admittedly contrived. Nevertheless, the fact that it is so easy to
develop an example wherein the percentage-of-assets approach fails suggests that the
approach has very limited applicability.
45
Low-powered incentives occur when a manager does not reap a large percentage of the value that her efforts create. For a discussion of low-powered incentives in
managerial compensation and leveraged buyouts, see Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
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offer a promising pay-for-performance package for managers of bankrupt firms.
4. Percentage of Equity Compensation Plans
Professor Skeel next suggests that managers receive a portion of
46
the reorganized entity’s stock. This proposal appears to give managers strong incentives to operate the debtor efficiently. The better a
firm’s operations perform in bankruptcy, the greater the value of the
reorganized entity, and therefore the greater the value of a manager’s
portion of equity. Nevertheless, Professor Skeel’s proposal includes
two flaws: it would both encourage an inefficient capital structure after reorganization and tempt the manager to understate the value of
the firm’s equity in order to secure approval of the plan.
a. Inefficient Capital Structure
Unfortunately, granting a manager a portion of the equity in a reorganized company provides the manager with poor incentives to restructure the company effectively. Rather than attempting to formulate a reorganization plan and financial structure that maximizes
value for the creditors of the bankrupt firm, the manager has an incentive to maximize the value of the equity in the reorganized entity.
Thus, the manager’s incentives may conflict with the creditors’ goals.
For example, the manager has an incentive to eliminate as much debt
47
as possible in reorganization. The less debt in the bankrupt company assumed by the reorganized company, the greater the value of
the reorganized company’s equity. A manager may even threaten to
destroy value to induce creditors to cancel more of their claims
against the reorganized debtor—clearly inefficient behavior. Relatedly, a manager promised a certain percentage of the equity in a reorganized corporation has no incentive to create a financial structure
that maximizes the value of the reorganized entity. Instead, the manager would prefer an all-equity capital structure with no debt to dilute
the value of her equity rights. This behavior may be inefficient. Researchers in corporate finance have identified many advantages to
48
debt as a means of mitigating a wide array of agency problems. If
46

Skeel, supra note 4, at 948.
Id.
48
For an overview of some of debt’s many advantages within a firm’s capital structure, see OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 95-155 (1995).
These advantages include (1) tax considerations (interest payments to creditors are
47
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the reorganized firm holds too little debt, agency problems may prove
formidable, thereby reducing the total value of the debtor’s assets.
The dangers of equity compensation can be highlighted in our
example. Suppose that Manager gets 5% of equity in the reorganized
Firm. Further suppose that, by mitigating agency problems, a capital
structure that has a debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1 makes the reorganized
Firm worth $40 million ($20 million in debt and $20 million in equity), while an all-equity reorganized Firm would be worth $30 million
($0 in debt and $30 million in equity). In this context, efficiency dictates that Manager should choose the debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1 because it realizes $10 million more in value. Manager would choose an
all-equity capital structure, however, because Manager’s return is
higher under this structure; 5% of the $30 million in equity of the allequity reorganized Firm is greater than 5% of the $20 million in equity of the more evenly balanced Firm, even though Firm is more
valuable with a debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1.
b. Skewed Incentives for Getting a Plan of Reorganization Confirmed
To be confirmed by a bankruptcy court, a plan of reorganization
must satisfy § 1123(a)(4), which requires that a plan “provide the
49
same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class.” Equity compensation plans, however, give managers incentives to understate the value of equity in order to get a plan confirmed that maxi-

deductible from corporate tax obligations, while dividends are taxed at both the corporate and personal levels), see Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate Income
Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 433, 434 (1963) (demonstrating that the tax advantages of debt financing are significant); (2) the value of preventing a manager from squandering free cash flows by requiring the manager to pay
out cash regularly in the form of interest, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, 323-26 (1976) (discussing the increases in efficiency that can be won
through investor monitoring of managers); and (3) the avoidance of the lemon problem (investors are more wary of firms issuing equity than firms issuing debt because
investors suspect that any firm that issues additional equity must be pessimistic about
its future prospects), see Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and
Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN.
ECON. 187, 207-09 (1984) (concluding that, empirically, issuing debt rather than equity is better for shareholders). Disadvantages of debt include increasing the risk of a
costly bankruptcy reorganization or investment-skewing financial distress. See, e.g.,
Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) Distress?
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443, 1443-46
(1998) (noting the correlation between highly leveraged transactions and debt default,
that together lead to bankruptcy or financial distress).
49
11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000).
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mizes the value of their stake in the reorganized company’s equity.
Because managers often have the best information about the company’s true value, such skewed incentives may wreak havoc with
50
courts’ ability to ensure that § 1123(a)(4) is observed.
Note that even though there is only one class of unsecured creditors of Firm, some of these creditors might prefer equity in the reorganized entity while others prefer debt. Furthermore, Manager will
have the best estimate of the true value of Firm. Other parties must
either rely on her estimates or expend considerable sums in developing their own estimates.
Under these conditions, Manager might have a strong incentive to
understate Firm’s value for two reasons. First, as the perceived value
of equity decreases, so does Manager’s perceived compensation.
Manager will then have an incentive to underestimate the value of
Firm’s equity in order to hide the true size of her compensation, thus
avoiding any public outrage over the size of her salary. Second, if
Manager continues in her role after reorganization, then her future
employers would be the shareholders in the reorganized firm. Manager might want to gain favor with her future employers by underestimating the value of their equity, thereby leading to windfall returns
for those taking equity compared with those taking debt. In total,
these inefficient incentives may cause significant additional complications in the already arduous process of getting different creditors to
agree to different securities in the context of a reorganization plan.
Thus, while pay-for-performance managerial compensation plans
in bankruptcy offer the promise of improved managerial performance, existing practice and proposals suffer from several flaws. Professor Skeel explicitly notes the value of “continued experimentation” in
51
this area. Along these lines, the next Part proposes a new plan, unsecured debt compensation for managers, that addresses many of the
flaws discussed in this Part while preserving the advantages of pay-forperformance.

50

For an analysis of the difficulties plaguing the valuation process in bankruptcy,
see Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 403, 414-38.
51
Skeel, supra note 4, at 949.

2007]

PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE IN BANKRUPTCY

797

C. Enron as an Example of the Deficiencies of Current
Methods of CEO Compensation in Bankruptcy
The Enron bankruptcy highlights many of the dangers of managerial compensation in bankruptcy described above. Once Enron declared bankruptcy, it hired a new manager, Stephen Cooper, head of
52
the turnaround firms Kroll Zolfo Cooper, LLC and Stephen Forbes
53
Cooper, LLC. Cooper was granted an annual salary of $1.32 million
and his firm was guaranteed a bonus of at least $5 million if Enron
54
avoided liquidation. The exact amount of the bonus was ultimately
subject to the bankruptcy court’s approval at the conclusion of the
55
case. Note the dangers inherent in these terms: Cooper’s salary did
nothing to enhance his incentives to maximize the value received by
the firm’s creditors, and his bonus gave him an incentive to avoid liquidation. Obviously, if liquidation was the efficient option, then this
incentive was inefficient, but even if liquidation was inefficient, Cooper’s incentives were still misplaced. Once Cooper succeeded in
avoiding liquidation, he had few direct incentives to take further steps
to maximize the value of Enron’s assets.
These deficiencies in managerial compensation undermined confidence in the Enron bankruptcy. Cooper directed Enron to hire
many employees of his own primary employer, Kroll Zolfo Cooper. By
the end of the bankruptcy, Enron had paid Kroll Zolfo Cooper over
56
$63 million in fees. As a principal in the turnaround firm, Cooper
clearly benefited from the fees earned by Kroll Zolfo Cooper. It is less
clear, however, that these fees benefited Enron. Cooper’s contract
provided no disincentive to incur such fees. So long as the fees
helped avoid a liquidation and could be explained to the bankruptcy
court as reasonable, Cooper had every incentive to hire his colleagues,
even if these hires did not maximize Enron’s value. Similarly, Cooper
52

A “turnaround firm” is a firm that specializes in improving the fortunes of bankrupt or distressed companies.
53
Floyd Norris & David Barboza, Lay Sold Shares for $100 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
16, 2002, at A1; U.S. Says It Found Problems in Enron Bankruptcy Billing, N.Y. TIMES,
March 28, 2006, at C3. Note that the purpose of this Section is not to suggest that Mr.
Cooper behaved improperly, but rather that many of Enron’s bankruptcy expenditures
may or may not have been efficient, and that the executive compensation structure did
nothing to encourage efficient expenditures.
54
Id.
55
See Jonathan Stempel, Enron CEO’s Firm Seeks $25 Mln “Success Fee”, REUTERS,
Sept. 3, 2004 (stating that Kroll Zolfo Cooper LLC “asked a bankruptcy judge for a . . .
‘success fee,’” clearly implying that the fee was subject to court approval).
56
Id.
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had no reason to reduce the size of Enron’s legal bills. High legal
costs may have reduced the probability of liquidation and thereby enhanced Cooper’s expected bonus, even if the legal fees did not ultimately raise the creditors’ return. In light of these factors, the questions surrounding the Enron bankruptcy—with fees totaling
57
approximately $1 billion, the “priciest on record” —persist. These
fees may have created even more than $1 billion of value for Enron.
The skewed incentives created by Cooper’s employment contract,
58
however, ensure that suspicion about the fees will linger.
The difficulty of providing performance incentives in bankruptcy
is further exemplified by Kroll Zolfo Cooper’s request for bankruptcy
court authorization of a $25 million “success fee” at the conclusion of
59
Enron’s bankruptcy.
In spite of the high fees billed to Enron by
Kroll Zolfo Cooper employees, the firm claimed that it was entitled to
the “success fee” because it had “produced extraordinary results for
60
the bankruptcy estate.” Kroll Zolfo Cooper may well have been telling the truth. The unclear criteria for granting pay-for-performance
compensation in bankruptcy, however, prevented creditors and the
bankruptcy court from having confidence that the success fee was a
bona fide pay-for-performance measure rather than a windfall created
by the fact that the head of Kroll Zolfo Cooper was also serving as the
head of Enron. Thus, whatever one thinks of Stephen Cooper’s performance as Enron’s manager, his compensation contract clearly
highlights the need for more effective pay-for-performance designs in
bankruptcy.
III. DEBT COMPENSATION FOR MANAGERS
A. Unsecured Creditors and Chapter 11 Bankruptcies
Before presenting the debt compensation proposal, it is crucial to
establish some context for the proposal’s place within a Chapter 11
61
62
bankruptcy.
With limited exceptions, the Bankruptcy Code pro57

Eric Berger, Enron’s Legal Fees Priciest on Record, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 19, 2003, at

1A.
58

See id. (quoting many sources suggesting that Enron’s bankruptcy fees were unnecessarily high).
59
Stempel, supra note 55.
60
Id.
61
Most large insolvencies occur in Chapter 11. See, e.g., Bris et al., supra note 18,
at tbls.1 & 2 (showing more corporate bankruptcies proceeding within Chapter 11
than Chapter 7 and presenting data to show that the assets of Chapter 11 companies
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vides that all unsecured creditors enjoy similar rights in bankruptcy.
The “adequate protection” clauses of §§ 363 and 364 subordinate un63
secured creditors to secured creditors. Notwithstanding the special
treatment of secured creditors, several provisions of the Code require
that similarly situated unsecured creditors receive similar treatment in
64
any plan of reorganization or liquidation of a bankrupt company. In
65
other words, similarly situated creditors share pro rata.
The “fair
and equitable” provisions, however, do not simply provide that all unsecured creditors get the same return on their money. Some unsecured creditors may be contractually senior to other unsecured creditors. If this is the case, then the “absolute priority rule” requires that
the senior unsecured creditors receive full payment before the junior
66
unsecured creditors receive any payments.
When a company files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a committee
(“the committee”) is formed to represent the interests of unsecured
67
creditors in the bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code further stipulates
that the committee consist of representatives from the seven largest
68
unsecured creditors. Alternatively, the Code allows the committee
to be composed of other willing creditors, so long as the creditors
serving on the committee are “representative of the different kinds of

are much greater than companies in Chapter 7). Note, however, that committees may
also be appointed in Chapter 7 liquidations. See 11 U.S.C. § 705(a) (2000) (providing
that unsecured creditors of a debtor in Chapter 7 may elect a creditors’ committee).
62
A few narrow classes of unsecured claims enjoy priority over other unsecured
creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (establishing a hierarchy of claims).
63
Id. §§ 363-364 (2000).
64
See, e.g., id. § 1129(b)(1) (providing that a plan of reorganization should be
confirmed “if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with
respect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan”); see also id. § 1123(a)(4) (requiring a plan of reorganization to “provide the same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class”).
65
Pro rata distribution means that all creditors in a given class get the same proportion of the face value of their claims. To illustrate, if one member of a class receives sixty cents for each dollar of debt, then all other members of the class should be
reimbursed at the same ratio.
66
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (requiring that a plan of reorganization—”[w]ith
respect to a class of unsecured claims—(i) . . . provides that each [member of a class]
receive or retain on account of such claim property of a value . . . equal to the allowed
amount of such claim; or (ii) [claimants] junior to the claims of such class will not receive or retain under the plan . . . any property”).
67
See id. §1102(a) (providing for the creation of a committee of creditors or equity
security holders after a Chapter 11 order).
68
See id. § 1102(b)(1) (“A committee of creditors . . . shall ordinarily consist of the
persons . . . that hold the seven largest claims against the debtor . . . .”).
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69

claims to be represented.” In practice, the committee is often chosen to be representative of the interests of a diverse group of creditors.
Unless the court finds that other committees are necessary because of
70
conflicts of interests between unsecured creditors, the committee is
well placed to represent the interests of unsecured creditors in a coherent fashion and to mediate conflicts between unsecured creditors.
B. Debt Compensation for Managers
Part II detailed the difficulty of “incentivizing” managers in bankruptcy. To improve managerial performance, I propose that the
committee be granted the right to award managers a percentage of
71
the unsecured debt of the insolvent firm. This right to grant debt
compensation can be created in one of two manners: either by statute
or through a compensation contract drafted by the debtor’s board of
directors. In either case, the compensation would be subject to the
72
committee’s approval. As the bankrupt corporation’s board of di-

69

Id.
See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 18. In large bankruptcies, several committees may be
formed to represent the interests of unsecured creditors with different contractual
rights to the assets of the bankrupt company. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (“On request
of a party in interest, the court may order the appointment of additional committees of
creditors or of equity security holders if necessary to assure adequate representation of
creditors or of equity security holders. The United States trustee shall appoint any
such committee.”). Although a variety of factors are pertinent to this two-step evaluation, courts tend to focus on (1) the presence of conflicted interests between the moving parties and the existing committee, (2) the costs associated with appointment, and
(3) the stage of the case. See In re Hills Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(evaluating the adequacy of a committee by examining conflicting interests and the
potential cost of creating additional committees, and listing “the nature of the case” as
a factor to be evaluated); In re McLean Indus., Inc., 70 B.R. 852, 860-61 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (acknowledging that while the test for determining the adequacy of a
committee’s representation is “necessarily vague,” two benchmarks include the presence of a potential conflict and cost).
71
If there are multiple classes of secured creditors, then a compensation right can
be granted to the junior secured creditors. Although this Article focuses on Chapter
11 bankruptcies, if a committee exists in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 705(a)
(providing for creditors’ committees for Chapter 7 bankruptcies), then this committee
should have the same powers as the unsecured creditors’ committee of a Chapter 11
debtor.
72
Because creditors are the typical residual claimants in bankruptcy, any compensation contract chosen by the board of directors effectively spends the creditors’
money. As a result, allowing the corporation’s board of directors to grant debt (a cost
imposed on the creditors) is not as radical a departure as it may seem since the compensation granted to the manager comes from the creditors in either case. As shown
below, debt compensation provides many advantages to the creditors that are unob70
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rectors may not zealously pursue the creditors’ best interests (despite
the board’s fiduciary duties), the statutory route is preferable because
it enables the committee to implement debt compensation without
interference from the board.
Under either mechanism, if the majority of the members of the
committee approves a given percentage of debt compensation and the
percentage meets a number of guidelines detailed later in this Arti73
cle, then the manager should receive the given percentage of all the
74
noncontingent unsecured claims on the company. Upon confirmation of a reorganization plan, the manager would receive the given
percentage of whatever amount the original creditors receive in lieu
of debt. For example, if debt in the original company is transformed
into equity in the reorganized company, then the manager would receive a percentage of equity, and if the unsecured debt is transformed
into debt in the reorganized company, then the manager would re75
ceive a percentage of this debt claim.
Every unsecured creditor
would be bound by this decision of the committee. To balance the
committee’s right, equity claimants should also be allowed to grant
the manager a percentage of their claims, but the percentage must be
the same as that granted by the general unsecured creditors. The
committee’s right to grant debt compensation should not be absolute.
Indeed, the court should have the right to veto the proposal if it feels
that the proposal unduly jeopardizes the interests of other interested
parties. The risks of debt compensation and the appropriate responses to these risks will be covered in Part IV.
Our example helps illustrate how the proposal would operate. Assume for simplicity that the value of Firm is realized in cash upon liquidation or reorganization at the moment Firm successfully concludes
76
bankruptcy. Now suppose that Firm’s committee chooses (by majority vote) to adopt the debt compensation scheme and award Manager

tainable with ordinary compensation contracts. Unsecured creditors may therefore
prefer debt compensation to other forms of managerial compensation.
73
See infra Part IV (discussing the potential responses to problems with a debt
compensation plan).
74
If a contingent claim subsequently becomes noncontingent (e.g., through a
judgment in a lawsuit), then the manager should be awarded the agreed-upon percentage whenever the claim is no longer contingent.
75
See infra Part IV.D (examining the consequences of allowing managers to hold
debt claims in the reorganized company).
76
In reality, Manager would receive the same securities that the original creditor
received in exchange for its unsecured debt. See infra Part IV.D (discussing this complication in further detail).
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3% of the unsecured debt of Firm. Following this vote, every unsecured creditor must relinquish 3% of the face value of her debt to
Manager. If Creditor A owns debt with a face value of $1 million, then
Manager would receive debt with a face value of $30,000 (3% of
Creditor A’s $1 million). Creditor A would then be left with unsecured debt with a face value of $970,000. In total, Manager will get
unsecured debt in Firm with a face value of $1.5 million (3% of Firm’s
$50 million), where $50 million is the total face value of Firm’s unsecured debt (Assumption 1).
Now suppose that the value of Firm in reorganization is $15 million and that Manager receives no salary other than the percentage of
the unsecured debt. Efficiency dictates that Firm should be liquidated, because its liquidation value of $20 million (Assumption 2) is
greater than the reorganization value of $15 million. In ordinary circumstances, however, Manager might be reluctant to liquidate rather
than reorganize because, among other things, liquidation means
Manager is out of a job. For this example, assume that Manager values a future job with Firm at $100,000.
Now compare Manager’s salary under the debt compensation
scheme if Manager chooses to liquidate versus reorganize. If Manager
liquidates, Firm would realize $20 million. The absolute priority rule
provides that secured creditors, whose claims total $10 million, would
be paid in full. This means that $10 million would remain for unsecured creditors (equity would get nothing), who have claims with a
face value of $50 million. The “fair and equitable” principle provides
77
that the unsecured creditors must share these proceeds pro rata.
Thus, each creditor would receive twenty cents for each dollar of face
value (.20 = $10 million ÷ $50 million). Manager’s portion of the debt
would be valued at $1.5 million; thus, she would receive $300,000 in
compensation ($300,000 = .20 × $1.5 million).
On the other hand, if Manager chooses to reorganize, then Firm
would realize only $15 million in value. After paying the secured
creditors, Firm would be left with $5 million for the unsecured claimants, thus leaving each unsecured creditor with only ten cents on the
dollar (.10 = $5 million ÷ $50 million). Manager would receive
78
$150,000 ($150,000 = .10 × $1.5 million).

77

See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (noting that the Bankruptcy Code
requires a reorganization plan to be fair and equitable in order to be confirmed,
which mandates pro rata distribution).
78
Recall that Manager was granted debt with a face value of $1.5 million.
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Thus, Manager’s compensation under reorganization is $150,000
less than her return under liquidation. Recall that Manager valued
the prospect of a future job with Firm if Firm reorganized at $100,000.
Accordingly, the self-interested Manager will make the efficient choice
(liquidation) because, from her view, liquidation yields greater overall
benefits than reorganization.
Without the debt compensation
scheme, however, Manager would have made the inefficient choice
(reorganization) because reorganization ensured Manager a job. For
example, if Manager received the same salary under liquidation or reorganization, then Manager would choose reorganization, because it
gives her a future job with a value of $100,000.
By ensuring that Manager would choose the efficient option, the
debt compensation scheme created value for unsecured creditors.
For example, although Creditor A gave up 3% of her debt to Manager, she benefited because she realized a greater return on the face
value of her debt. With liquidation, Creditor A’s debt would be worth
$194,000 (.20 × $970,000 = $194,000). Without debt compensation,
by contrast, Manager would choose reorganization, leaving Creditor A
79
with only $100,000 ($100,000 = .10 × $1 million). Thus, an unsecured creditor might have good (and efficient) reasons to relinquish
some debt in order to improve Manager’s incentives.
C. Why Debt Compensation Is an Improvement upon Existing
Means of Managerial Compensation in Bankruptcy
In the preceding example, it was no coincidence that debt compensation facilitated the efficient result. Debt compensation aligns
the incentives of managers with the incentives of the typical residual
claimants in bankruptcy—the unsecured creditors. As a result, debt
compensation encourages a manager to pursue actions that are in her
self-interest, while also improving the return of the unsecured creditors. Just as grants of stock options and restricted stock are believed to
foster good behavior in managers of solvent firms, so too does unsecured debt compensation promote value-maximizing behavior in
managers of bankrupt firms. This alignment of a manager’s incentives with those of bankruptcy’s typical residual claimants makes debt
compensation an improvement upon other pay-for-performance plans
and proposals.
79

Note that this example understates the benefit of debt compensation versus salary for Manager because it assumes that, if debt compensation is not adopted, Manager’s salary is zero—an obviously unrealistic assumption.
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1. Improvement over Pay-To-Stay Bonuses
Just like pay-to-stay bonuses, debt compensation provides an incentive for managers to remain with an insolvent firm. A manager
who might receive a percentage of the unsecured debt in the firm enjoys the prospect of a large payment upon the completion of bankruptcy. As a result, debt compensation should accomplish the goal of
pay-to-stay bonuses—decreasing the incentive of managers to leave the
80
“sinking ship.”
Unlike pay-to-stay bonuses, debt compensation accomplishes additional goals as well. By aligning incentives and encouraging the manager to stay with the firm, debt compensation offers better performance per dollar of compensation value, making
debt compensation clearly superior to simple pay-to-stay bonuses.
2. Improvement over Rapid-Reorganization Bonuses
As discussed earlier, reorganization speed is only loosely corre81
lated with efficiency. As a result, rapid-reorganization bonuses may
engender value-destroying incentives for managers. Debt compensation, by contrast, correlates managerial compensation much more
closely with value maximization. Consequently, debt compensation
better improves managerial performance.
Recall our example in Part II.B.2, wherein Manager faced a decision to hire consultants to accelerate the reorganization process.
Suppose that if Manager does not hire the consultants, Firm will be
worth $30 million in reorganization. If Manager hires the consultants,
then Firm will be worth $35 million in reorganization (because of a
faster reorganization), but Firm will incur $10 million in costs, for a
net value of $25 million. The unsecured creditors would prefer that
Manager not hire the consultants because they cost more than they
are worth. If Manager is to receive a rapid-reorganization bonus, however, Manager will have an incentive to hire the consultants regardless
of the effect on the unsecured creditors.
Now assume that Manager receives debt compensation of 3% of
the face value of the unsecured debt. If Manager hires the consultants, then (after paying the secured claimants in full) $15 million re-

80

See supra Part III.B (calculating the greater financial incentive a debt compensation plan gives Manager).
81
See supra Part II.B.2 (evaluating a compensation plan that is tied to the speed of
reorganization).
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82

mains for unsecured creditors. Unsecured creditors then would receive thirty cents on the dollar (.30 = $15 million ÷ $50 million).
Therefore, Manager’s $1.5 million in debt would be worth $450,000
($450,000 = .30 × $1.5 million). If, however, Manager chooses not to
hire the consultants, then $20 million would remain for unsecured
83
creditors in reorganization, meaning that they would receive forty
cents on the dollar (.40 = $20 million ÷ $50 million). Manager’s compensation would then be worth $600,000 ($600,000 = .40 × $1.5 million). Given these incentives, Manager would make the efficient
choice and not hire the consultants. Thus, this example demonstrates
how debt compensation improves upon rapid-reorganization bonuses
by providing a closer alignment between managerial performance and
managerial compensation.
Note that debt compensation dictates the efficient outcome in the
opposite case as well—if the consultants add value, then Manager would
hire them. Suppose that the consultants add $15 million in value to
Firm for the cost of $10 million. In this case, $25 million remains for
unsecured creditors after secured creditors are satisfied, giving each
unsecured creditor fifty cents on the dollar (.50 = $25 million ÷ $50 million). Manager’s debt then would be worth $750,000 ($750,000 = .50
× $1.5 million). Because $750,000 is greater than the $600,000 that
Manager would receive if the consultants were not hired, Manager
would hire the consultants, as efficiency dictates. Debt compensation
thereby ensures that consultants are hired when they add value and
are not hired when they do not. Rapid-reorganization bonuses, however, bias Manager in favor of hiring consultants even when the consultants do not add value.
3. Improvement over Percentage-of-Assets Plans
Percentage-of-assets plans help ensure that managers maximize
84
value if liquidation is the clear choice. These plans, however, suffer
from two flaws. First, if liquidation is not the clear choice, then percentage-of-assets plans may skew incentives toward inefficient liquida-

82
Hiring the consultants makes the net value of Firm $25 million. Secured creditors are owed $10 million, leaving a residual value of $15 million for unsecured creditors.
83
Not hiring the consultants makes the value of Firm $30 million. After paying
the secured creditors in full, this leaves $20 million for unsecured creditors.
84
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the benefits and limitations of percentage-ofassets plans).
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tion. Second, these plans may be overly expensive. Debt compensation, by contrast, provides incentives for managers to make the efficient choice between liquidation and reorganization in all contexts.
Debt compensation also provides higher-powered incentives than percentage-of-assets plans, making it the less expensive of the two op85
tions.
Recall the example presented in Part II.B.3.a. Firm is worth $15
million in reorganization and $10 million in liquidation. If Manager
gets 3% of assets in liquidation and an $80,000 salary upon reorganization, then Manager will choose liquidation, in spite of the fact that
reorganization is the efficient choice. Consider the same scenario
when Manager receives 3% of unsecured debt. If Manager chooses
liquidation, all of Firm’s $10 million of value goes to pay secured
creditors, leaving unsecured creditors with nothing. Manager, whose
debt is unsecured, would receive nothing. If Manager chooses reorganization, however, then $5 million would be left over after the secured creditors are compensated. Manager’s $1.5 million of debt
compensation is therefore worth $150,000 ($150,000 = $1.5 million ×
($5 million ÷ $50 million)). Thus, Manager is encouraged to choose
reorganization—the efficient choice, because her incentives are
closely aligned with the interests of the residual claimants.
Debt compensation may also provide higher-powered and less expensive incentives than percentage-of-assets plans. Returning to the
example in Part II.B.3.b, suppose that liquidation is the best option
for Firm. With good managerial performance, the liquidation value
of Firm would be $12 million; with bad performance, the liquidation
value would be $10 million. Now suppose Manager is awarded 3% of
assets. If Manager performs well, she would receive $360,000 (.03 ×
$12 million = $360,000), but if Manager performs poorly, she would
receive only $300,000 (.03 × $10 million = $300,000). Under these assumptions, the percentage-of-assets plan provides Manager with appropriate incentives. Because Manager shares the increase in value
with creditors, Manager will self-interestedly attempt to garner the
higher liquidation value for Firm.
This same incentive is also assured by the percentage-of-assets
plan, but to a lesser degree. The difference in compensation between
the good and the bad performance states ($60,000) is a small per-

85

Although debt compensation plans are less expensive than percentage-of-assets
plans, cost remains an important obstacle to the use of debt compensation. See infra
Part IV.A.
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centage of the total guaranteed compensation of $300,000. The percentage-of-assets plan may therefore be called “low powered” in the
sense that it requires a considerable total expenditure of money to
86
create sufficient incentives for the appropriate managerial behavior;
over $300,000 must be spent to generate $60,000 in incentives.
Contrast this with the outcome using debt compensation. Suppose that the unsecured creditors grant Manager 3% of unsecured
debt. If Manager performs poorly, then Firm would be worth $10 million. This amount only suffices to compensate the secured creditors;
the unsecured creditors would receive nothing. As a result, Manager’s
3% stake in unsecured debt has no value. If Manager performs well,
by contrast, then Firm would be worth $12 million. After paying the
secured creditors, unsecured creditors are left with $2 million, meaning they would get four cents per dollar of debt (.04 = $2 million ÷
$50 million). Manager’s $1.5 million in face value is therefore worth
$60,000 ($60,000 = .04 × $1.5 million).
Debt compensation gives Manager the same incentive to attain the
good result (an additional $60,000) as the percentage-of-assets plan,
but at a much cheaper cost. Whereas the percentage-of-assets plan
would grant Manager at least $300,000 in any scenario, debt compensation only rewards good performance. Debt compensation therefore
87
offers higher-powered incentives than percentage-of-assets plans.
This more preferable incentive structure is achieved by not offering Manager a percentage of the secured debt. This makes good
sense; secured creditors should not compensate Manager, because
they do not depend on her performance in order to receive payment.
As a result, granting Manager a percentage of Firm that is reserved for
88
secured creditors is wasteful.
The debt compensation approach
avoids this problem by granting Manager a percentage of unsecured
debt exclusively.

86

See supra note 45 for a definition of low-powered incentives.
In reality, of course, Manager will always receive some compensation. The purpose of the example is to show that debt compensation creates tailored incentives that
are superior to the blunt approach of the percentage-of-assets scheme.
88
In the typical bankruptcy, secured creditors get paid in full. See Bris et al., supra
note 18, at tbl.8 (indicating that the average secured creditor is paid in full). Thus, the
example is realistic in suggesting that secured creditors get paid in full in every eventuality. When secured creditors will not be paid in full (for example, if there are junior
secured creditors), the junior secured creditors should participate in the debt compensation plan.
87
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Debt compensation therefore ameliorates two of the primary flaws
of the percentage-of-assets plan: it does not skew incentives to liquidate, nor does it cost as much.
4. Improvement over Equity Compensation Plans
As explained in Part II.B.4, equity compensation plans suffer from
a number of defects. Two prominent defects are skewed incentives to
create an efficient capital structure and skewed incentives to provide
accurate valuations of debt as opposed to equity. Debt compensation
mitigates or eliminates both of these defects.
Debt compensation gives managers incentives to shape an efficient capital structure for reorganized firms. To illustrate, return to
the example presented in Part II.B.4.a. In this version of the example,
a debt-equity ratio of 1 to 1 adds value to the reorganized Firm by
89
mitigating agency problems.
Firm is worth $40 million with this
debt-equity ratio, but only $30 million when the Firm has an all-equity
structure. If Manager receives equity compensation, she has incentives to fashion a less efficient all-equity capital structure because the
greater the value of equity, the greater Manager’s return.
With debt compensation, by contrast, Manager would choose the
appropriate capital structure. Assume that Manager receives 3% of
unsecured debt. If Manager chooses the all-equity capital structure,
then $20 million would remain for unsecured creditors after secured
creditors are satisfied. Manager’s $1.5 million face-value debt would
therefore be worth $600,000 ($600,000 = $1.5 million × ($20 million ÷
$50 million)). If Manager chooses the more balanced capital structure, by contrast, then $30 million would remain for unsecured creditors, meaning that Manager would receive $900,000 ($900,000 = $1.5
million × ($30 million ÷ $50 million)). Thus, Manager will choose the
efficient capital structure when receiving debt compensation. Because reorganization of the capital structure is one of Manager’s essential roles in bankruptcy, this feature of debt compensation constitutes a significant advantage over equity compensation plans.
With debt compensation, Manager also will have no incentive to
overvalue debt with respect to equity. If Manager produced an overestimate of the value of debt in the reorganized Firm relative to equity,
then Manager’s equity compensation would be underestimated.

89

For an explanation of how debt’s presence in capital structure can add value,
see supra note 48.
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While Manager may prefer this combination when receiving equity
compensation because it understates the value of her compensation,
she has no such incentive with debt compensation. So long as Manager provides a reasonably accurate description of the total value of
the company, her total compensation will appear the same regardless
of whether she exaggerates the value of one class of securities with respect to another. As a result, Manager has no incentive to misestimate
the values of different securities. With greater confidence in Manager’s valuations, creditors can place more reliance on these estimates
when choosing whether to vote for a plan of reorganization. Courts
will also benefit from greater confidence in Manager’s estimations
when deciding whether to confirm or to reject a plan of reorganiza90
tion.
This Section has examined the superiority of debt compensation
with respect to many alternative forms of managerial compensation in
bankruptcy. Unlike these other compensation structures, debt compensation provides incentives for efficient managerial actions without
creating incentives to distort the process of reorganization. As such,
debt compensation presents an important new tool for improving
managerial performance in bankruptcy.
5. Improvement of the Functioning of the Creditors’ Committee
At present, creditor participation on the creditors’ committee suf91
fers from free-rider problems. All of the creditors share the benefits
of the increase in value created by the committee’s monitoring of the
debtor. Only the creditors on the committee bear the costs of monitoring, however. The other creditors free ride on the committee’s ef92
forts. As a result, creditors are reluctant to join the creditors’ com-

90

A plan of reorganization must meet several criteria in order to receive court approval. Whether or not a plan meets the criteria will depend critically on valuations of
different securities. For example, it is impossible to know if a plan meets the “best interests of the creditors” test without evaluating the disbursements to claimants. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000) (describing what is commonly called the “best interests of
the creditors” test and requiring that a reorganization plan provide creditors with no
less than they would have received in liquidation).
91
J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213, 271 (1991)
(“It is not surprising . . . why unsecured creditors are hesitant to become members of a
creditors’ committee. It is clearly to the advantage of an unsecured creditor to adopt a
‘free-rider’ strategy . . . and hope that some other unsecured creditor will . . . bear the
cost of serving on the committee.”).
92
See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that the committee is “not compensated
for [its] efforts” and “[m]oreover, as a member of the committee, a creditor is charged
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mittee or, if they do join, to monitor the debtor efficiently. The freerider problem therefore undermines the effectiveness of the creditors’
committee in protecting the creditors’ interests.
Debt compensation mitigates this problem in a number of ways.
By aligning the incentives of managers with those of creditors, debt
compensation reduces the need for monitoring. With debt compensation, managers self-interestedly pursue actions that benefit the
creditors, decreasing the importance of effective creditor monitoring.
The salience of the free-rider problem is thereby reduced.
Debt compensation also raises the incentive for creditors to join
the creditors’ committee. Debt compensation confers an important
new power on the members of the committee—the ability to influence
the use or non-use of debt compensation. This power would be particularly important to the largest creditors, who have the most to gain
or lose through debt compensation. Consequently, debt compensation raises the incentive for these creditors to join the committee by
adding to the advantages of committee service.
By encouraging large creditors to join the creditors’ committee,
debt compensation enhances the ability of that committee to oversee
the manager. Large creditors are often the most sophisticated parties
with the best ability to monitor. In addition, large creditors are less
likely to free ride. If one creditor holds half the debt of a bankrupt
company, then that creditor enjoys half the gains of its monitoring efforts while bearing all the costs of these efforts. While even this creditor will monitor less than optimally because of mismatched incentives,
the large creditor’s monitoring efforts should be greater than those of
a small creditor. A small creditor garners a much smaller proportion
of the gains of monitoring than the large creditor, while continuing to
bear the full cost of the monitoring efforts. By raising the incentive
for creditors with superior monitoring ability to join the creditors’
committee, debt compensation improves the ability of the committee
to monitor the debtor.
By improving managerial incentives and the functioning of the
creditors’ committee, debt compensation constitutes an important advance in managerial compensation in bankruptcy. It is not without
(surmountable) complications, however, as the next Part demonstrates.

with looking out not only for its own interests but also for those of the other general
creditors”).

2007]

PAYING FOR PERFORMANCE IN BANKRUPTCY

811

IV. WEAKNESSES OF DEBT COMPENSATION AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES
Although debt compensation for managers in bankruptcy offers
many advantages over other compensation structures, it is no panacea.
Several potential flaws and complications may obstruct debt compensation’s efficacy. These flaws include debt compensation’s expense,
the creation of managerial biases in favor of some groups of creditors
with respect to others, and the difficulty of unwinding the debt compensation structure once a firm has reorganized. While none of these
complications is insoluble, judges and lawmakers must shape the debt
compensation approach to ensure that the benefits described above
are realized. This Part examines the potential shortcomings of debt
compensation and discusses means of mitigating these weaknesses.
A. Debt Compensation’s Expense
High expense may plague the debt compensation approach. As
93
discussed with respect to the percentage-of-assets plan, percentage
compensation provides low-powered incentives—improved performance only raises a manager’s pay by a small percentage of the total
94
compensation.
Moreover, debt compensation bears some resemblance to stock options and other executive compensation plans that
have recently fallen into ill repute for granting managers large wind95
falls without improving performance.
If debt compensation improves performance by a little but costs a lot, then it may not be worth
the trouble.
High expense should not obstruct debt compensation for two reasons. First, as noted above, debt compensation does not simply award
the manager a percentage of the entire firm. Because secured debt is
likely to be repaid in any event, managerial incentives are not improved by awarding the manager a percentage of secured debt. In response, debt compensation excludes secured debt. By focusing the

93

See supra Part II.B.3.b.
For a discussion of low-powered incentives, see Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., MayJune 1990, at 138, 140.
95
For a comprehensive discussion of the failure of pay-for-performance incentives,
see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 6-7; Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 261-62 (1990). But see
Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 653, 654-55 (1998) (finding that CEO compensation is strongly related to firm
performance and attributing this relationship to stock option grants).
94
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incentive compensation on the typical residual claimant—the unse96
cured creditor —debt compensation facilitates higher-powered incentive compensation. Second, debt compensation is voluntary;
creditors’ committees can choose not to employ the plan if it is believed to be too expensive.
1. Opt-out for Senior Unsecured Creditors
Excluding secured creditors from debt compensation improves
the “power” of debt compensation and ensures that secured creditors
will not be forced to pay for compensation that does not yield them
considerable benefits. Debt compensation may still be low powered,
however, if secured debt is small relative to unsecured debt. If a bankrupt firm’s entire debt load is unsecured, for example, then the secured debt exception does not foster higher-powered incentives. As a
result, debt compensation may prove to be low powered and to cost
more than it is worth under some circumstances.
Allowing some senior classes of unsecured creditors to opt out of
debt compensation would heighten the impact of each debt compensation dollar on managerial performance. As discussed above, all unsecured creditors are not alike. Some debt contracts give some unsecured creditors priority with respect to other unsecured creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes this eventuality by providing for the
establishment of additional creditors’ committees when “necessary to
97
assure adequate representation of creditors.”
Senior unsecured creditors should be allowed to “opt out” (as a
group) of the debt compensation package. To illustrate this, modify
Assumption 1 of our example from Part I so that there are no secured
creditors of Firm. Instead, suppose that senior unsecured creditors
hold $15 million in face value-debt, while general unsecured creditors
are owed $35 million. Assume that a senior unsecured creditors’
committee has been appointed to protect the interests of the senior
lenders. Suppose also that Firm will be worth $20 million or $25 million, depending on Manager’s performance. Finally, assume that the
unsecured creditors’ committee, representing ordinary unsecured
creditors, grants 3% of debt to Manager.

96

See Bris et al., supra note 18, at tbl.8 (finding that although debts to secured
creditors are typically satisfied, debts to unsecured creditors often are not).
97
11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2) (2000).
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If the unsecured creditors’ committee’s decision binds all unsecured creditors, then Manager would receive $1.5 million ($1.5 million = .03 × $50 million) of face value of unsecured debt. Senior unsecured debt would make up $450,000 ($450,000 = .03 × $15 million)
of this face value, while $1.05 million ($1.05 million = .03 × $35 million) of this debt would be general unsecured debt. If Firm is worth
$20 million, then the absolute priority rule provides that the senior
unsecured creditors would get paid in full while the general unsecured creditors would receive the $5 million that remains after the
senior unsecured creditors are fully compensated. In this case, Manager’s senior unsecured debt would be worth $450,000 while her general unsecured debt would be worth $150,000 ($150,000 = $1.05 million × ($5 million ÷ $35 million)), for a total compensation of
$600,000. If Firm is worth $25 million, then Manager’s senior unsecured claims would be worth $450,000 while her general unsecured
debt would be worth $300,000 ($300,000 = $1.05 million × ($10 million ÷ $35 million)), for a total of $750,000. Thus, Manager’s salary
would increase by 25% (.25 = ($750,000 - $600,000) ÷ $600,000) with
good performance.
If senior unsecured creditors are allowed to opt out of debt compensation and form a senior unsecured creditors’ committee (a likely
outcome when senior unsecured creditors constitute a large group of
98
creditors), then this committee should vote on whether or not to
participate in the debt compensation plan by awarding the manager
the same percentage of senior debt chosen by the official unsecured
creditors’ committee. When there is no senior creditors’ committee,
senior creditors should vote to opt in or opt out of the debt compen99
sation. If a majority (by value) of a given class of senior creditors
votes to opt out of debt compensation, then the manager would receive no senior debt. But if a majority votes to opt in, then the man-

98

Some courts have stated that the “chief concern [in deciding whether or not to
appoint an additional committee] . . . is whether it appears that different classes of
debt and equity holders may be treated differently under [the] plan and need representation through appointment of additional committees.” In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert Group, Inc., 118 B.R. 209, 212 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). Conflicts between senior creditors and other creditors are extremely common when there is a large group of
senior unsecured creditors. In these circumstances, it is quite likely that a committee
will be appointed to represent senior unsecured creditors.
99
Alternatively, opting out of a debt compensation plan may require a two-thirds
majority by value and a simple majority by number of senior unsecured creditors. This
two-thirds in value, one-half in number rule is the standard used for confirmation of a
plan of reorganization by an impaired class of creditors.
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ager would receive a percentage of all the senior debt (including the
100
debt of those who vote against the proposal).
In our example, senior unsecured creditors would vote to opt out
of debt compensation. No matter how Manager performs, Firm
would be worth more than $15 million, meaning that the senior creditors would be paid in full under any eventuality. As a result, senior
creditors would refuse to relinquish any of their debt as compensation
to Manager. The opt-out by senior creditors renders debt compensation a more effective and less expensive means of compensation.
When senior creditors opt out, Manager would receive $1.05 million
in face value of general unsecured debt, which is 3% of the total general unsecured debt. This means that if Manager performs poorly,
she would earn $150,000 ($150,000 = $1.05 million × ($5 million ÷
$35 million)); if she performs well, she would receive $300,000
($300,000 = $1.05 million × ($10 million ÷ $35 million)).
The absolute size of the incentive for Manager to perform well (an
extra $150,000) is thus the same whether or not senior creditors
choose to opt out. When senior creditors opt out, however, the total
cost of managerial compensation goes down by $450,000 because senior creditors are not forced to turn over debt to Manager. Thus, allowing senior creditors to opt out reduces the potentially high costs of
debt compensation while retaining the same positive impact of managerial incentives.
2. Debt Compensation Is a Voluntary Plan
The strongest defense against debt compensation’s high expense
is that it is voluntary—creditors’ committees can choose whether or
not to employ the plan. If debt compensation is not worth the expense, the committee is free to reject it. If creditors believe that debt
compensation is worth the cost, however, then the law should facilitate its use. Just as shareholders of corporations are free to grant equity to managers to improve managerial compensation, so too should
creditors be allowed to arrange similar pay-for-performance plans in
bankruptcy.
Many commentators criticize non-bankruptcy pay-for-performance
plans for promising more than they deliver. If a manager effectively
controls a board, for example, then the manager may be able to gar-

100

For a discussion of why a majority vote should be binding on all creditors, see
infra Part IV.B.1.
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ner outsize compensation that is labeled “pay-for-performance,” but is
actually a large handout that provides few positive incentives to the
101
manager.
“Pay-for-performance” underperforms ordinary compensation in these circumstances.
While these flaws caution against slavish reliance on pay-forperformance, they are unlikely to be as salient with regard to debt
compensation in bankruptcy. A manager is unlikely to enjoy the same
control over a creditors’ committee that she sometimes enjoys over a
102
board of directors. As commanded by statute, creditors’ committees
103
must be composed of large or representative creditors.
A manager
cannot nominate candidates, nor does she have a seat on the committee. As a result, a manager cannot dominate a creditors’ committee in
the same way that she might dominate a board of directors. Debt
compensation for managers in bankruptcy is therefore more likely to
reflect sound business decision making by the creditors’ committee
than rent-seeking behavior by the manager.
In spite of debt compensation’s voluntariness, courts should remain vigilant for abuses. If a court feels that debt compensation results from managerial domination of the creditors’ committee rather
than business fundamentals, the court should reject the debt compen104
sation plan. By requiring the approval of a third party to grant debt
compensation, the worst managerial compensation abuses should be
avoided.
B. Conflicts Between Creditors Caused by Debt Compensation
Some creditors may be harmed by debt compensation. If the plan
causes managers to favor one group of creditors over another, then its
benefits may be outweighed by its costs. While fears of inefficient behavior by debt-compensated managers may be overstated by some

101

Scholars have suggested that “pay-for-performance” plans often fail to achieve
their purpose. See supra note 95 (citing sources debating the effectiveness of pay-forperformance).
102
For examples of the way managers can sometimes dominate the boards of directors of companies outside of bankruptcy, see Michael J. Wolf, Op-Ed., Media Mutiny,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2003, at A14.
103
11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1) (2000).
104
Although such determinations are typically difficult for courts to make, the detailed involvement of the court with the affairs of a bankrupt company means that the
court will have some basis on which to make the determination. Moreover, the court
will have other reasons, described infra Part IV.F, to reject debt compensation plans
that may result in very large payoffs to managers.
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groups of creditors, there will occasionally be some merit to these
claims. To prevent debt compensation from causing inefficient
managerial behavior, courts should follow some of the guidelines presented here before approving a debt compensation plan.
As a general matter, it should be emphasized that the fact that
some groups of creditors are harmed by debt compensation is not reason to doubt its usefulness. Bankruptcy procedures strive to obtain
the greatest value from the bankrupt firm, not to satisfy any particular
105
group of creditors.
If debt compensation maximizes value, even
while harming one group of creditors, then it adds value and should
still be encouraged.
1. Conflicts Among General Unsecured Creditors
Although it is unlikely that all general unsecured creditors will be
happy with the decision to grant debt compensation, they must all be
bound by the decision of the creditors’ committee. Binding all creditors prevents free riding by some. If some general unsecured creditors were allowed to opt out of granting debt compensation, they
would gain the performance-enhancing benefits of debt compensation without having to pay for them. This potential for free riding
may convince many creditors to vote against an efficient debt compensation plan. To prevent this eventuality, a debt compensation
award must be binding on all general unsecured creditors.
Making the decision of the creditors’ committee binding upon all
general unsecured creditors is not a radical idea. Shareholders of a
company outside of bankruptcy cannot opt out of stock option plans.
Instead, the shareholders are bound by the decision of the board of
directors. Similarly, general unsecured creditors should be bound by
106
the decisions of the unsecured creditors’ committee.

105

See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 231-32 (4th ed. 2006)
(describing bankruptcy as an attempt to “make the best of a bad situation” and suggesting that the absolute priority rule is not a critical consideration for today’s large
bankruptcies).
106
At times, the creditors’ committee may also require the debtor to take certain
actions. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 580 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding
that a creditors’ committee could sue the company to force it to avoid fraudulent
transfers).
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2. Conflicts Between Secured Creditors and Unsecured Creditors
Debt compensation runs against the interests of secured creditors.
Because a manager’s interests are aligned with those of the unsecured
creditors, the manager may favor unsecured creditors over secured
creditors.
In some circumstances, a manager’s tendency to favor unsecured
creditors may lead to inefficient outcomes. Returning to the example
from Part I, modify Assumption 3 to make reorganization a riskier
process. If Firm pursues a reorganization, there is a 60% chance that
Firm will be worth $30 million and a 40% chance that Firm will be
worthless ($0). Under this assumption, efficiency dictates that Firm
should liquidate because its liquidation value of $20 million (Assumption 2) is greater than its expected reorganization value of $18 million
($18 million = (.60 × $30 million) + (.40 × $0)).
Debt compensation will not lead to the efficient outcome under
these conditions. Under liquidation, $10 million remains for unsecured creditors after compensating secured creditors. Under attempted reorganization, by contrast, unsecured creditors get an average receipt of $12 million ($12 million = .60 × ($30 million - $10
million) + (.40 × $0)). When Manager receives debt compensation,
her percentage of unsecured debt will be worth more (on average)
under reorganization than under liquidation. Thus, Manager will
choose reorganization, in spite of the fact that liquidation is the efficient choice.
This flaw in debt compensation is not as problematic as it might
seem. First, in many cases, the secured creditors are comfortably over107
secured.
As a result, this scenario should not occur too frequently.
Second, the Bankruptcy Code includes many protections for secured
creditors. For example, a debtor may not use an asset that provides
security for a creditor without providing that creditor “adequate pro108
tection” for that asset. Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code explains
that adequate protection means that the secured creditor should not
107

An over-secured creditor’s security interest is worth more than the underlying
loan made by the creditor. In this event, the over-secured creditor’s interest in the collateral is limited to the value of the claim. 11 U.S.C.A. § 506(a)(1) (West Supp. 2006).
108
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2000) (granting a secured creditor relief from the
automatic stay if the debtor does not provide adequate protection for the asset). Once
a secured creditor is granted relief from the stay, that creditor can prevent the debtor
from using the asset that acts as security (e.g., by foreclosing on the asset). See BAIRD,
supra note 1, at 177 (explaining that a secured creditor granted relief from the stay can
seize its collateral).
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suffer a loss in value because the debtor continued to use the secured
109
asset in bankruptcy.
If pursuing a plan of reorganization risks the
loss of the secured creditor’s security, the secured creditor can therefore request relief from the automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy
Code. Thus, it is not likely that the bankruptcy court will approve actions, like the one described above, that place the secured creditors of
a firm in jeopardy of losing their security. The secured creditor protections offered by the Code thus mitigate the chance that debt compensation will unduly harm secured creditors. As a practical matter,
these protections appear to work effectively. Recall that secured
creditors are paid at least 95% of each claim in more than threequarters of all Chapter 11 bankruptcies, suggesting that debt compen110
sation should not unduly harm them.
In addition, most managers will not receive debt compensation
exclusively. Instead, they will be compensated by a combination of
salary and debt. The salary constitutes a priority administrative ex111
pense.
If the “adequate protection” offered to secured creditors
proves insufficient, then the remaining funds owed to the secured
112
creditors have priority over managers’ salaries.
As a result, managers will experience some loss of compensation if secured creditors are
not compensated in full. This provides added protection for secured
creditors. In the example presented above, Manager would not receive any salary if she attempted reorganization and Firm had no
value. This would make Manager more reluctant to choose an inefficient reorganization over a more efficient liquidation.
If unsecured creditors feel that they have little to lose (if they are
out of the money, for example), then they may be willing to grant the
manager a very high percentage debt compensation. A very high percentage might encourage inefficient managerial choices. Returning
to our example, modify Assumption 2 to make the value of Firm in
liquidation $10.4 million rather than $20 million. In addition, modify
Assumption 3 to make the value of Firm if it pursues reorganization
$30 million with a 10% probability and $0 with a 90% probability. Assume also that Manager receives $400,000 in salary in addition to any
debt compensation. Note that under these circumstances, unsecured

109
110
111
112

11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000).
Bris et al., supra note 18, at tbl.8.
11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2006).
11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000).
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creditors receive nothing if Firm liquidates—the liquidation value
113
equals the value of secured claims and Manager’s salary.
Under these circumstances, liquidation is clearly the efficient out114
come.
If Manager receives debt compensation of 3%, then she
would choose liquidation. Manager’s desire to preserve her $400,000
salary exceeds her incentive to maximize the value of unsecured debt.
The unsecured creditors (who receive nothing under liquidation),
however, have nothing to lose by granting Manager much higher levels of debt compensation to encourage her to attempt an inefficient
reorganization. Suppose that the unsecured creditors grant Manager
50% of the face value of unsecured debt. In this case, Manager would
choose reorganization because her pecuniary incentive to maximize
115
the value of her debt compensation exceeds her salary.
In spite of
the high debt compensation award, unsecured creditors would gain as
well; by encouraging Manager to choose reorganization, the high debt
compensation award opens the possibility that unsecured creditors
will receive some compensation. Had unsecured creditors not
granted such a high percentage, Manager would have chosen liquidation, and then the unsecured creditors would be left with nothing.
Thus, in some scenarios, debt compensation can lead to an inefficient
outcome despite the presence of managerial salary.
To protect against this outcome, courts should take a number of
precautions. First, they should be especially vigilant in protecting secured creditors’ rights when managers receive debt compensation.
Second, and more importantly, courts should reject debt compensa116
tion plans that award overly high percentages to managers.
To determine when a percentage is overly high, courts should compare the

113

See 11 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West Supp. 2006) (providing that administrative expenses such as salaries receive priority over ordinary unsecured claims). Thus, Manager’s salary must be paid in full before unsecured claimants receive any compensation.
114
Liquidation realizes $10.4 million. Reorganization yields an expected value of
$3 million ($3 million = (.10 × $30 million) + (.90 × $0)).
115
If Firm liquidates, Manager receives $400,000. If Firm reorganizes, Manager
receives an expected value of approximately $1 million (.10 ($400,000 + .05 ($30 million - $10.4 million)) + (.90 × $0) ≈ $1 million).
116
To give committees and managers an incentive to choose reasonable percentages, a rule might be adopted that only one debt compensation plan can be put forward to the court. If the court rejects the debt compensation plan, then debt compensation cannot be used with respect to the manager in question. This would prevent the
committee from “pushing the envelope” with its debt compensation proposal, secure
in the knowledge that if one plan were rejected, the committee could subsequently
modify the plan to ensure court acceptance.
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percentage of debt received by the debt-compensated manager with
the percentage of equity (in the form of stock grants and stock options) granted to managers of similar firms outside of bankruptcy. If
the manager’s debt compensation percentage is considerably higher
than those of her peers outside of bankruptcy, then the court should
reject the debt compensation plan because there is a high risk that the
plan will create inefficient incentives.
The conflict between secured creditors and unsecured creditors in
bankruptcy shares a number of similarities with the conflict between
117
debt claimants and equity claimants in an ordinary company.
In
these companies, managers are commonly granted stock and stock
options, in spite of the fact that such compensation introduces conflicts between creditors’ interests and managers’ interests. Just as incentive compensation is permitted in these contexts, so too should it
118
be permitted within bankruptcy.
Nevertheless, the threats caused by incentive compensation to the
interests of senior creditors are real. Outside of bankruptcy, these
creditors receive protections against managerial misbehavior, such as
a change in managerial fiduciary duties as companies reach the zone
119
of insolvency. Within bankruptcy, courts should provide the protections described here.
3. Conflicts Between Senior Unsecured Creditors
and General Unsecured Creditors
Because senior unsecured creditors may want to provide strong
incentives to managers, the availability of debt compensation will often be a positive development for this set of creditors. When senior
unsecured creditors do not need to provide such incentives, the optout mechanism described in Part IV.A.1 reduces the cost of debt
compensation. Even with the opt-out mechanism, however, senior
unsecured creditors will occasionally be harmed by debt compensation.

117

See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1506
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (illustrating a situation where bondholders sought relief from an action by shareholders that harmed the value of the bonds).
118
For an analysis of the “asset substitution” conflict between debt and equity,
which is analogous to the conflict described here, see Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and
Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 473-75 (1992).
119
See supra note 15 (presenting cases discussing the fiduciary duties to creditors).
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The conflicts between senior unsecured creditors and ordinary
unsecured creditors parallel those between secured creditors and unsecured creditors. Unsecured creditors who are “out of the money”
may grant secured creditors an extremely high percentage of their
debt to encourage them to take large risks. If the risks pay off, the unsecured creditors reap much of the benefits. If the risks fail to pay off,
however, then the senior unsecured creditors bear much of the cost.
As explained above, unsecured creditors may be best off awarding an
extremely large percentage in these circumstances. Moreover, senior
unsecured creditors do not enjoy some of the protections offered by
the Bankruptcy Code to secured creditors.
Because of these concerns, courts should refuse to approve a debt
compensation plan that has been rejected by the senior unsecured
creditors when (1) there is a large amount of senior unsecured debt
relative to total unsecured debt—making it more likely that senior unsecured creditors, and not general unsecured creditors, are the residual claimants of the firm; and (2) the debt compensation amounts
awarded to managers by the unsecured creditors’ committee are excessively large. These conditions indicate a heightened probability
that debt compensation is being used to encourage inefficient risk taking rather than value maximization. When these conditions are not
present, courts should approve debt compensation plans because they
are likely to be efficient.
4. Conflicts Between Equity and Unsecured Creditors
Debt compensation may harm the interests of equity claimants in
bankruptcy. Because debt compensation aligns the interests of managers with those of unsecured creditors, managers may favor these
120
creditors’ interests over those of equity claimants.
If equity holders
are the true residual claimants of a firm, then the manager’s incentives to improve the value of unsecured debt may be inefficient.
These concerns should not be overstated. First, it is unlikely that
equity will be the residual claimant of the firm. When equity is the residual claimant, the firm is solvent. If the firm is solvent, it is unlikely
to be in bankruptcy because it should be able to meet its obligations

120

Because unsecured creditors implement debt compensation by handing a percentage of their claims to the manager, equity claimants do not bear the actual cost of
debt compensation.
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121

in full.
As a result, debt compensation will only inefficiently skew
managerial incentives in the rare case where a solvent firm cannot
find financing outside of bankruptcy to resolve a liquidity crunch.
Second, debt compensation functions as a useful corrective
against managers’ tendency to have “interests closely aligned with the
122
shareholders.”
Under debtor-in-possession rules, the manager of
the bankrupt firm is commonly the pre-bankruptcy manager, who was
123
“only appointed due to equity concerns.”
In addition, the manager
frequently holds stock and stock options in the firm. Given this background, there is a danger that managers will unduly favor the interests
of equity. Debt compensation combats this tendency: rather than biasing bankruptcy against equity, debt compensation brings creditors’
rights into greater balance with those of equity.
Because of the risk that equity will be harmed by debt compensation, equity holders should be allowed to participate in the compensation plan. To illustrate, suppose that the creditors’ committee of Firm
grants debt compensation of 3%. If equity has the option of participating, then shareholders will have the right to grant 3% of equity to
Manager. This ensures that Manager treats equity’s interest just as she
treats creditors’ interests. With the option to participate in the compensation plan, equity cannot complain that its interests are harmed
by debt compensation.
C. Joint Administration
124

Many bankruptcies are jointly administered.
When a parent
company and its subsidiaries declare bankruptcy at the same time, one
bankruptcy court will often “jointly administer” all of the bankruptcy
proceedings for this group of companies. Unsecured creditors of the
different entities will often have different preferences in these circumstances. For example, a holding company’s asset-to-liability ratio may
125
be greater than that of its subsidiaries.
In these circumstances, the
goals of the holding company’s unsecured creditors will diverge from
121

Indeed, by changing the incentives of managers in bankruptcy, debt compensation serves as a useful check against opportunistic bankruptcies by solvent firms looking to use bankruptcy to alter burdensome contractual or tort obligations.
122
BAIRD, supra note 1, at 182.
123
Id.
124
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b)(4) (authorizing “joint administration of estates”
involving a debtor and an affiliate).
125
See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. 852, 854 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (describing a solvent parent company and its insolvent subsidiaries).
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those of the subsidiary’s creditors. Courts have recognized this problem and established a general rule that, “[w]here multiple cases are
jointly administered, multiple committees may be more appropriate”
126
to protect the divergent interests of all the creditors.
The potential conflicts among the various groups of unsecured
creditors resemble those between senior unsecured creditors and
127
general unsecured creditors discussed earlier. Creditors of an entity
with a large number of assets in proportion to debts may prefer not to
participate in a potentially expensive debt compensation plan. Creditors of less well-situated entities may see little to lose in granting the
manager an outsize percentage. Debt compensation procedures must
mediate between these opposing goals.
In jointly administered cases, the committee of unsecured creditors representing the largest group of creditors by value should be entitled to devise a debt compensation plan. Other committees of unsecured creditors should be free to opt out of this plan, just as senior
unsecured creditors should be allowed to opt out of debt compensa128
tion. If there is only one unsecured creditors’ committee, the unsecured creditors of each entity should be allowed to opt out of the debt
compensation plan through a vote of all the unsecured creditors.
This procedure allows unsecured creditors with different goals to
adopt different solutions. If the largest group of unsecured creditors
holds relatively low-value claims, however, then it may attempt to grant
the manager a particularly large percentage and force the creditors of
the other entities to either opt out or devote an unreasonably large
amount to managerial compensation. Such a plan grants the man129
ager inefficient incentives to undertake overly risky projects.
To
prevent this occurrence, bankruptcy courts should reject plans that
grant managers an overly generous percentage. That a percentage is
overly high can be determined by comparing the proportion of debt
granted to the manager with the proportion of equity granted to
managers in comparable firms outside of bankruptcy.

126

7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 1102.02[4][a] (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th
ed. rev. 2006).
127
Supra Part IV.B.3.
128
Even in jointly administered cases, there is no guarantee that multiple committees will be formed. See, e.g., In re McLean Indus., 70 B.R. at 861-62 (describing the factors to consider in determining whether multiple committees are necessary).
129
For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see supra Part IV.B.3.
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D. Manager Has Debt in Reorganized Company
1. Problems with Debt Holding by Managers
In a reorganization, creditors receive claims against the reorgan130
ized company in exchange for their original claims against the firm.
The plan of reorganization divides all the creditors into different
classes, with all the members of a particular class holding substantially
131
similar claims against the bankrupt firm.
Further, the plan determines the structure of the new claims received by each class in ex132
change for the original claims.
The new claims against the firm received by a class might not be the same type of claims as the original
133
For example, some creditor classes of the
claims held by the class.
134
original firm might receive cash for their claims.
Other classes
might receive debt claims in the reorganized company in lieu of their
135
original debt claims.
Still others might be required by the plan of
reorganization to exchange their debt claims for equity claims in the
136
reorganized entity.
With debt compensation, a manager receives a percentage of the
debt of several classes. For example, if senior unsecured creditors
choose to remain in the debt compensation plan, they will undoubtedly constitute a different class of creditors than general unsecured
creditors. The different classes of creditors may well receive different
types of claims in the reorganized firm.
To illustrate, suppose that there are two classes of unsecured
creditors of Firm, Class A and Class B, because Firm has issued two
separate series of bonds with different bond indenture contracts but
otherwise identical priority levels. Both classes of unsecured creditors
join in a debt compensation plan, granting Manager 3% of the face
130

See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 203 (“[F]or the prototypical Chapter 11 case, the old
claims against the firm disappear with the discharge and the new obligations of the
firm take their place.”).
131
See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (2000) (indicating that “substantially similar” claims
should be placed in the same class).
132
See BAIRD, supra note 1, at 198-222 (describing the formation of a plan of reorganization).
133
See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(exchanging tort creditors’ pre-bankruptcy claims for beneficial interests in a trust
consisting of cash and large equity stake in the reorganized firm).
134
See, e.g., id.
135
See, e.g., id. (endowing the trust with the right to receive fixed annual payments
for a fixed duration from the reorganized firm).
136
See, e.g., id.
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value of debt. Class A holds $30 million in face-value debt, while Class
B holds $20 million. Suppose further that Firm will have an expected
value of $35 million after reorganization. Finally, suppose that the
plan of reorganization, which was confirmed, calls for Class A to receive unsecured debt in the reorganized Firm with a face value of $15
million, while Class B receives equity in the reorganized Firm with an
expected value of $10 million.
Under these conditions, Manager realizes $450,000 ($450,000 =
.03 × $15 million) in debt in the reorganized Firm (from Class A) and
$300,000 ($300,000 =.03 × $10 million) in equity in the reorganized
Firm (from Class B) as a result of debt compensation. While this scenario works well in ensuring that Manager designs a value-maximizing
and nondiscriminatory plan of reorganization, Manager’s postreorganization incentives are skewed. In the plan of reorganization
just described, equity holders are the residual claimants—Firm is solvent after reorganization. Manager’s decisions primarily impact the
equity holders’ return, and not that of the debt holders. Manager’s
fiduciary duty also lies with the equity holders. In these circumstances, the $450,000 in debt held by Manager as a result of debt
compensation constitutes a conflict of interest. Although Manager’s
fiduciary duty lies with the equity holders, Manager has a pecuniary
incentive to maintain the value of debt as well as that of equity. Consequently, Manager may be excessively cautious, choosing to forego
profitable but risky investment opportunities because they create a
risk that Manager’s debt will decline in value. If the debt compensation plan included additional classes of creditors receiving different
types of securities, then the conflicts could grow even worse.
2. Responses to These Concerns
As with many of the other critiques described in this Part, this
concern should not be overstated. Although managerial incentives
are altered when managers hold debt, this problem is not unique to
bankruptcy. Almost every manager receives a salary, but, ultimately,
137
salaries in bankruptcy resemble debt.
Thus, all managers suffer

137

Indeed, some aspects of managerial salaries may cause even more managerial
risk aversion than will ordinary debt. If the bankrupt company rejects an employment
contract with its manager, the manager’s damages are capped by the Bankruptcy Code.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (2000). To avoid becoming constrained by this provision,
managers may make low-risk decisions that minimize the risk of bankruptcy, but do not
maximize value.
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from split incentives—managers want to increase the value of equity
to please their employers and maximize the value of their stock options; managers also strive to protect their salaries by avoiding large
(but potentially favorable) risks. Awarding a manager debt in the reorganized firm through debt compensation does not create a new
conflict of interest. At worst, it merely contributes to a problem that
already exists.
In addition, managerial debt holding creates some positive incentives. When a manager holds debt, she is less likely to engage in inefficiently risky behavior, secure in the knowledge that the downside
138
risks are borne not by equity holders but rather by debt holders.
This concern looms large in reorganized companies. Although plans
of reorganization must convince the court that the firm will not be
139
forced back into bankruptcy, many once-bankrupt firms wind up in
140
Chapter 11 a second time.
Granting a manager some debt reduces
the likelihood of this occurrence—the manager has a selfish interest
in avoiding a second bankruptcy, which would reduce the value of her
debt holdings.
When a manager receives both debt and equity, she has less incentive to exaggerate the value of one security with respect to another in
lobbying for the confirmation of a plan of reorganization. If creditors
have greater trust in the manager, reorganization will occur more rapidly and efficiently.
3. Possible Modifications to Debt Compensation
In spite of all these positive incentives, post-reorganization debt
holding by a manager as a result of debt compensation should be limited for the reasons discussed above. Courts should require managers
to sell their debt claims as soon as possible. The larger and more liquid the market for a reorganized company’s debt, the greater the
141
speed with which managers should be obligated to sell their debt.

138

Cf. GRINBLATT & TITMAN, supra note 11, at 569, 587 (discussing the asset substitution problem and the ability of management compensation contracts to mitigate this
problem).
139
This “feasibility test” is established by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).
140
Firms that return to bankruptcy a second time are called “Chapter 22s.” For a
study of Chapter 22s, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001).
141
When markets are illiquid, there is a heightened risk that a large sale by a manager would not yield the true value of the debt.
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This plan avoids forcing managers to dump all of the debt immediately in a fire-sale fashion and also allows managers to search for a
good price. Moreover, the price a manager receives for the debt will
be a reflection of the market’s (typically accurate) perception of that
142
manager’s performance during reorganization. If the market thinks
the reorganized company is in dire straits, then that manager will receive little for the debt.
This suggestion ameliorates the incentive-damaging effects of
managerial debt holding after reorganization, while retaining the
benefits of debt compensation. Because a manager must sell her debt
to the highest bidder in a market, she is less likely to push for a shaky
plan of reorganization that leaves a high probability of a return to
143
bankruptcy.
In addition, there is a reduced chance that debt holding will permanently dissuade the manager from necessary risk taking
because the manager must sell her debt as soon as possible. While no
plan is perfect, the requirement that a manager sell her debt as soon
as possible after reorganization enables debt compensation to proceed without overly jeopardizing the operations of the reorganized
company.
E. Change in Pre-bankruptcy Incentives
Debt compensation also impacts pre-bankruptcy managerial in144
centives.
When a manager knows that she is likely to receive a portion of the firm’s debt should the firm enter bankruptcy, her propensity to file may increase. In addition, the manager may take a
different view toward debt in the pre-bankruptcy period. Although
142

See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 551-52 (1984) (discussing the relationship between information availability and market efficiency).
143
The US Airways bankruptcy is one such case. US Airways emerged from bankruptcy in March 2003. Just a few months later, the airline had returned to its shaky
financial position and filed for bankruptcy a second time on September 12, 2004. See
Key Dates in US Airways Latest Ch. 11 Filing, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16518-2004Sep12.html (last visited Feb.
17, 2007) (listing important developments since US Airways’ March 2003 bankruptcy).
144
See Paul Povel, Optimal “Soft” or “Tough” Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 659, 660 (1999) (discussing the perceived advantages for managers of delaying
formal bankruptcy). Plans that would ordinarily encourage prompt bankruptcy filings
can lead to counterintuitive results under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Yair Listokin, Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
403, 431-32 (2005) (finding that tort creditor priority in bankruptcy may have the perverse effect of harming rather than helping tort claimants in bankruptcy because tortcreditor priority encourages managers to inefficiently delay a bankruptcy declaration).
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both these developments are a change from the status quo, they are
not necessarily negative. Indeed, they may bring some welcome
changes in managers’ pre-bankruptcy behavior.
1. Debt Compensation’s Impact on the Propensity To File
Debt compensation potentially raises a manager’s total compensa145
tion during bankruptcy.
Knowing this, a manager of a firm near
bankruptcy self-interestedly prefers to file with debt compensation because of the prospect of a higher salary. This tendency may be costly.
The legal and administrative costs of bankruptcy are expensive. In
addition, bankruptcy sends a frightening signal to employees and
other parties engaged with the firm. These parties may curtail or end
146
their relationship with the firm as a result of bankruptcy.
Employees with other employment options, for example, will prefer to explore those options rather than face an uncertain future with a shaky
organization. By encouraging bankruptcy, debt compensation increases the frequency with which these costs will be borne by the
firm—an undesirable development.
Avoiding bankruptcy also has some negative effects. Firms in financial straits suffer from uncertainty. A supplier of a firm with dwindling cash reserves may be reluctant to extend credit whether or not
the firm has declared bankruptcy. Furthermore, a near-bankrupt firm
enjoys none of the protections conferred by bankruptcy. The firm
cannot obtain a stay against any creditor judgments, nor can it bring
all of its claims into one forum for a rational reordering. In addition,
the firm cannot take advantage of DIP financing that helps reduce
uncertainty for many suppliers and other parties contracting with the
147
firm.
By encouraging bankruptcy, debt compensation reduces
many of these costs.
In addition, it is not clear that debt compensation will increase the
prevalence of bankruptcy to an undue degree. Debt compensation
accrues only to the manager of the bankrupt firm. In many bank-

145

This need not be the case. For example, the manager’s salary can be reduced
to reflect the expected increase in compensation from a debt compensation award.
146
The availability of DIP financing reduces these trends by ensuring that the
debtor has enough cash to maintain everyday operations. DIP financing cannot eliminate the uncertainty associated with bankruptcy, however.
147
For a discussion of bankruptcy’s many benefits, see BAIRD, supra note 1, at 1520.
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ruptcies, the manager is fired soon after the bankruptcy declaration.
Even if the manager is not fired, the manager does not necessarily receive debt compensation. Instead, the creditors’ committee makes
this decision. If the creditors’ committee feels that the bankruptcy
was unwarranted, it is are unlikely to grant debt compensation to the
manager. Because of these considerations, the pro-bankruptcy effects
of debt compensation should not be overstated.
In many ways, debt compensation’s pro-bankruptcy effects are
beneficial. The appeal of debt compensation in bankruptcy counterbalances the manager’s fear of dismissal as a result of bankruptcy.
With the prospect of debt compensation, the manager will be less
likely to resist an otherwise efficient bankruptcy to protect her position.
2. Debt Compensation’s Impact on Managers’
Treatment of Creditors Before Bankruptcy
Debt compensation also changes the way managers will perceive
debt as a firm approaches bankruptcy. At present, many factors align
149
the interests of managers with those of equity.
As the firm enters
the zone of insolvency, this tendency becomes inefficient. Managers
make decisions to improve the interests of equity, but their decisions
potentially affect creditors’ interests a great deal. In particular, managers have an incentive to take on risky projects. If the projects succeed, then bankruptcy is avoided and equity benefits. If the projects
150
fail, then creditors’ claims decline in value while equity loses little.
For example, suppose that Firm has $60 million in debt outstanding
and is worth $55 million if it continues on its present course. Manager can invest in a risky project that will either make the value of the
firm $80 million or $20 million, each with 50% probability. The expected value of the Firm with the risky project is $50 million. Thus,

148

In both the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies, for example, the managers
brought in after fraud was discovered were fired early in the bankruptcy proceedings, even though they were unconnected to the fraud. See Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Chief
Exec’s Selection: A Mystery to Many, CAREERJOURNAL.COM, Aug. 26, 2003, http://
www.careerjournal.com/columnists/managersjournal/20030826-managersjournal.html (discussing the firing of several managers in firms going bankrupt).
149
See Hall & Liebman, supra note 95, at 654-55 (noting the linkages between
managerial compensation and a firm’s equity interests).
150
For examples of this pattern, see the cases cited supra note 15. Firms in the
zone of insolvency, by definition, have equity that is of little value. If equity had considerable value, then the firm would not be insolvent.
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efficiency dictates that Manager should reject the risky project. From
equity’s perspective, however, the risky project is best. Equity holders
receive nothing if Firm continues on its present course, because
Firm’s debt obligations exceed its value. By pursuing the risky project,
equity’s expected payoff becomes $20 million if the project succeeds
($20 million = $80 million - $60 million) and $0 if the project fails. If
Manager follows equity’s interests, then Manager makes an inefficient
decision.
The law recognizes this danger and imposes a unique form of fi151
duciary duty upon officers of a firm in the zone of insolvency.
Here, officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize value rather than to
maximize the value of equity. This helps prevent managers from making inefficient decisions that benefit equity but cause a greater detriment to creditors.
While the change in fiduciary duty mitigates the tendency of managers to take inefficient actions as a firm becomes insolvent, it cannot
eliminate the problem. As a general matter, breach of fiduciary duty
is exceedingly difficult to prove. Unless a manager has taken truly
outlandish risks, she will have little trouble arguing that her decisions
were motivated by a desire to maximize value.
Debt compensation in bankruptcy improves the incentives of
managers to make efficient decisions before bankruptcy. The plan
accomplishes this goal by effectively granting the creditors some oversight of the manager. With debt compensation, decisions that hurt
the value of debt potentially hurt the manager. Any given percentage
of debt will be worth less if the manager makes inefficient decisions
before bankruptcy. In addition, the manager knows that the creditors
will decide whether or not to adopt debt compensation, as well as the
appropriate percentage award. Creditors are unlikely to award debt
compensation if they feel that the manager has made inefficient decisions in the pre-bankruptcy period. Anticipating these effects, the
manager has less of an interest in engaging in the overly risky behavior that commonly characterizes the pre-bankruptcy period. Thus,
debt compensation aligns the pecuniary interests of the manager with
her fiduciary duties before bankruptcy as well as within it. For this
reason, debt compensation’s benefits extend well beyond bankruptcy.
151

See Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that, under
Delaware law, officers and directors of an insolvent firm owe a fiduciary duty to their
corporation’s creditors); see also cases cited supra note 15 (exemplifying courts’ recognition that creditors are common residual claimants, and are owed fiduciary duties as a
result).
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F. Cautious Implementation Should Prevent
the Worst Abuses of Debt Compensation
The previous Sections examined several potential shortcomings of
debt compensation. While each shortcoming can be adequately addressed, the advantages of debt compensation can be fully obtained
only with competent judicial decision making. Without such judicial
capabilities, the risks identified here may transform debt compensation from a powerful new tool for managerial compensation in bank152
ruptcy into a windfall for unscrupulous managers and creditors.
None of the criteria suggested above for judicial approval or rejection of a debt compensation plan appear unworkable. For example,
overly generous debt compensation plans should be easy to identify
and reject. If the debt compensation percentage is well above the
norms for incentive compensation in comparable firms outside of
bankruptcy, then the debt compensation plan should be struck down.
This standard should prevent the most outrageous and inefficient
debt compensation plans from occurring. But what of debt compensation plans that appear high, but still may be defensible? Such debt
compensation schemes might be efficient, and it is much harder for
judges to determine their value. Until bankruptcy courts have seen a
number of debt compensation plans in action, it will be difficult to
know whether a plan is value maximizing or not.
Because of this difficulty, bankruptcy courts should adopt a cautious stance with regards to debt compensation plans until they are
well established. So long as judges lack experience with debt compensation plans, they should reject any such plan that appears questionable, even if the plan may be value maximizing. As judges grow more
comfortable with the mechanics of debt compensation, they can expand the range of approved debt compensation plans in accordance
with their practiced judgment.
Cautious adoption of debt compensation offers several advantages. By allowing only modest deviations from the status quo, cautious adoption ensures that debt compensation will not engender any
unforeseen disasters, allowing judges to develop some comfort with
debt compensation while the stakes are reasonably low. Similarly, cau-

152

Even without competent judicial decision making, the chances of such an outcome should be less in the case of debt compensation than in the case of other forms
of managerial compensation in bankruptcy. See supra Part III.C. For an example of
the view held among some scholars that executive compensation more generally is a
windfall for unscrupulous managers, see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 3, at 137-46.
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tious adoption will allow judges to learn which of the potential dangers described above, if any, are relevant in practice while the costs of
mistakes are at their smallest. Procedures to address any potential
flaws can then be developed. Finally, cautious adoption will enable
bankruptcy practitioners to grow comfortable with debt compensation.
The standards for judicial review of debt compensation articulated
in this Part, combined with cautious adoption of debt compensation,
should enable the realization of the considerable benefits of debt
compensation at minimum cost and risk.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a new form of incentive compensation in
bankruptcy that constitutes an improvement over existing compensation plans and proposals. Granting the unsecured creditors’ committee the right to offer debt compensation to managers institutes much
better incentives for value-maximizing managerial performance. Debt
compensation creates incentives for managers to self-interestedly
maximize the value of the firm rather than attempt to protect their
own jobs or favor one class of creditors over another. As a result, debt
compensation offers a potentially important new method for improving managerial performance during bankruptcy, when managerial
performance assumes a more critical role. Debt compensation comes
with some pitfalls, however. For debt compensation to realize its potential, judges must be vigilant against those attempting to abuse debt
compensation for inefficient ends. This task is not intractable, however, and debt compensation’s potentially prodigious benefits make
the risks worth bearing.
More generally, debt compensation is an example of the potential
for CEO compensation to improve bankruptcy performance. Just as
scholars of solvent companies place a heavy emphasis on the role of
CEO compensation in corporate governance, so too should scholarly
attention be redirected toward the subject of compensation in bankruptcy.

